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**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLAR ARASI İLİŞKİLER**

**TWO HISTORIES ONE CONFLICT  
An Analysis of the Cyprus Conflict within the Framework of Conflict  
Resolution Theory**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ**

**Arda BATU**

**Danışman: Prof. Dr. Haluk ÜLMAN**

**İstanbul - 2005**

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## ABSTRACT

**Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Haluk Ülman**

The multi-faceted and complex Cyprus conflict has significant implications for a number of parties and has been on the international agenda for over four decades. The following study involves an overview of the critical junctures of the Cyprus conflict, incorporating significant resolution-seeking efforts since the 1950s. We shall explore the issues associated with the conflict and the continuous efforts to unite the peoples of the island, with a special emphasis on the prospect of a united Cyprus joining the European Union.

Upon assessing the conflict and numerous negotiation and mediation efforts, an analysis will follow, which will be structured around theories of conflict resolution so as to shed light on the reasons of the protracted nature of the conflict, to investigate where and how conflict resolution techniques have fallen short so-far, and finally to provide insight on appropriate and effective ways to resolve this case. In this chronological assessment, we shall show how the Cyprus conflict grew into a protracted and intractable conflict.

## ÖZET

**Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Haluk Ülman**

Çok deęişkenli ve karmaşık Kıbrıs sorunu bir den çok tarafı ilgilendirmekte ve kırk yılı aşkın süredir uluslararası gündemi meşgul etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Kıbrıs sorunundaki kritik gelişmelere genel bir bakışla özetlerken, özellikle 1950’li yıllardan bu yana süre gelen çözüm girişimlerinin üzerinde durulmuştur. Adadaki ihtilafa ilişkin unsurların incelenmesinde Avrupa Birliğinin rolü ve etkilerinin altı çizilmiştir.

Süregelen çözüm girişimleri inceledikten sonra ihtilaf çözünürlüğü teorileri çerçevesinde Kıbrıs meselesi genel olarak analiz edilecektir; spesifik olarak bu meselenin neden bunca yıl, ve özellikle son on senede, çözülemedięi araştırılacaktır. Özellikle son dönemde çözümsüzlükte pay sahibi faktörler işaret edilip çözüme giden yola ışık tutacak önerilerde bulunulmaya çalışılacaktır.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this thesis owes much to Haluk Ülman, my thesis advisor and dean of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences at Yeditepe University, where I work as a research assistant. Beyond his dedicated supervision of my thesis, he has been an inspiration to me and the rest of the faculty at the university. I am deeply thankful to Mr. Ülman for accepting to supervise my thesis regardless of the fact that he has no connection to my masters program at Marmara University. I was lucky enough to draw from his vast experience and knowledge of the Cyprus conflict. Beyond his personal input, Mr. Ülman has arranged some critical interviews for me in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Through Mr. Ülman, I met with former Under-Secretary of the President, Mr. Necati Münir Ertegün and Mr. Ergün Olgun. As “insiders,” both enabled me to capture the realities of the Cyprus conflict. I am especially thankful to Mr. Olgun for providing me with a wide variety of resources from both sides, i.e. Turkish and Greek Cypriot. Former Turkish Ambassador Hayati Güven to TRNC was also kind enough to meet with me and furthermore arrange a meeting with the then President Mr. Rauf Denktaş.

I would also like to thank Mr. Haluk Kaabalioglu, dean of the Faculty of Law at Yeditepe University. He was kind enough to give me access to his vast personal library, from where I accessed resources not easily attainable.

Last but not least, I would like to express gratitude to Mr. Armağan Emre Çakır, head of the EU Politics and International Relations Department at Marmara University. His personal support at every stage of my masters study has carried me to the completion of this thesis.

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Anchored in the Eastern Mediterranean, almost at the geographical centre of the ancient world, the history of the island of Cyprus is filled with waves of conquest and colonization. Famous in classical times as the birthplace of Aphrodite, the Goddess of Love, the island, with some sense of irony, has been home to extreme inter-communal conflict in the second half of the Twentieth Century.

The past half century has witnessed violent and protracted conflicts between identity groups, defined in cultural, ethnic, ideological, racial, or religious terms which have been increasingly challenging the peace of the international community. The Cyprus conflict and other prominent conflicts such as the ones in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland are just a few among countless cultural, ethnic and religious disputes of the world.

The numerous conflicts around the globe can unsurprisingly vary considerably in their nature; hence, a major challenge is to identify these many different types of conflicts and the different sets of factors that bring them about. However, as Brown states, the search for a single factor or set of factors that explains everything is comparable to the search for the Holy Grail- noble, but futile.<sup>1</sup> The Cyprus conflict is no exception. As in most protracted conflicts, the Cyprus conflict comprises a wide variety of issues including structural, political, economic, social and cultural factors.

The multi-faceted and complex Cyprus conflict has significant implications for a number of parties and has been on the international agenda for over four decades. The following study involves an overview of the critical junctures of the Cyprus conflict, incorporating significant resolution-seeking efforts since the 1950s. We shall explore the issues associated with the conflict and the continuous efforts to unite the peoples of the island, with a special emphasis on the prospect of a united Cyprus joining the European Union and becoming part of “the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”<sup>2</sup>

Upon assessing the conflict and numerous negotiation and mediation efforts, an analysis will follow, which will be structured around theories of conflict resolution so as to shed light on the reasons of the protracted nature of the conflict, to investigate where and how

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<sup>1</sup> Brown, Michael E., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996

<sup>2</sup> Treaty on European Union, article A

conflict resolution techniques have fallen short so-far, and finally to provide insight on appropriate and effective ways to resolve this case. In this chronological assessment, we shall show how the Cyprus conflict grew into a protracted and intractable conflict.

### **Conflict & Conflict Resolution in Cyprus**

The word “conflict” may be used to refer to physical confrontation or struggle, insinuating a fight or battle, but it is used more broadly to mean a disagreement or opposition of interests or ideas, over values and issues. John Burton describes conflict as “a relationship in which each party perceives the other’s goals, values, interests or behavior as antithetical to its own”<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Rubin, Pruitt and Kim define conflict as a “perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the current parties’ aspirations cannot be met simultaneously.”<sup>4</sup>

As mentioned above, there are numerous types of conflicts, many of which still await resolution. The abundance of conflicts around the world has enabled the field of conflict resolution to grow into a science of its own, with its highly interdisciplinary character “drawing its discourse from all the social sciences and even further,” as Boulding had envisioned during the birth of the field in the 1950s.<sup>5</sup>

Conflict resolution is often a very complicated and lengthy process; it does not simply mean a friendly chat between foes or an acquaintance mediating as a third party. It is a comprehensive approach based on mutual problem-sharing between the conflict parties. Resolution of a conflict implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed, changing behavior so it is no longer violent, attitudes so they are no longer hostile, and structures so they are no longer exploitative. The process of conflict resolution includes becoming aware of a conflict, diagnosing its nature and applying appropriate methods in order to diffuse the negative emotional energy involved; enable the disputing parties to understand and resolve their differences; and resolve the differences so as to achieve solutions that are not imposed, which have been agreed by all the key parties, and which address the root causes of the conflict.<sup>6</sup>

We shall overview the reactions of the governments involved in the conflict and how this interplayed with mediation efforts of the UN and efforts of the EU. Official government-to-government negotiation among instructed representatives of sovereign states is referred to

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<sup>3</sup> Burton, John, *Conflict Resolution as a Political System*, Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Working Paper 1, George Mason University, 1998, pg.11

<sup>4</sup> Rubin, Jeffrey, Pruitt, Dean and Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement*. Ed. 2 New York: McGraw Hill, 1994

<sup>5</sup> Kenneth Boulding on the publication of the first issue of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1957.

<sup>6</sup> University of Bradford, Centre for Conflict Resolution, [www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/body\\_unit1.html](http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/body_unit1.html)



as “Track-One Diplomacy.” Although it is governments that are ultimately responsible for negotiating, signing, and ratifying agreements and treaties that may be necessary to seal a peace between adversaries, in most cases of ethnic or sectarian conflict, Track-One alone will not necessarily identify, include, or allow a full and fair hearing for all of the antagonists in a conflict.<sup>7</sup> This is because in ethnic conflicts in particular, one side or another often denies the legitimacy of the other side’s existence, especially if the other side is a non-state actor such as a rebel or seceding group.<sup>8</sup> This situation is true in case of the Cyprus conflict, hence it was international intervention in the form of mediation and not track-one diplomacy that has been the dominant form of conflict resolution efforts in the island.

Negotiation and mediation play a crucial role in conflict resolution processes, as we shall see in the Cyprus case. Whereas mediation refers to a dispute resolution process involving the assistance of a third party, negotiation is a process whereby the parties to the conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflicts themselves.

There are some basic principles that carve the path to successful negotiation and mediation, one of which is symmetry. As the word itself implies, symmetry in negotiations means that negotiating parties have veto powers and this condition provides the situation of power equality.<sup>9</sup> Zartman defines symmetry as both the goal and the assumption of successful negotiation because parties negotiate most productively when they feel equal and they achieve the most satisfactory results when they view the process as fair. We shall see that an opposing state of power asymmetry is dominant in the Cyprus conflict. In our final analysis, we shall of course touch upon other factors that influence the negotiation and mediation environment. We shall discuss the leverages used by third parties and try to define their role in the conflict. In doing so, we will utilize terminology coined by a wide range of conflict analysts.

Furthermore, we shall see that as in most conflict situations, the Cyprus conflict contains subjective and objective elements both of which need to be addressed in the resolution process. Objective aspects are those that are largely independent of the parties’ perceptions, including competition for power, scarce resources, territory, or other historically determined institutions and structures. Subjective approaches to conflict resolution involve

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<sup>7</sup> Bercovitch, Jacob, ed. *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, pg. 167

<sup>8</sup> Bahavar, David, *Beyond Mediation: The Integral Role of Non-governmental Approaches to Resolving Protracted Ethnic Conflicts in Lesser Developed Countries*, www.

<sup>9</sup> Rubin, J., Z., and Brown, B., R., *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation*, New York: Academic Press, 1975

attempts to improve the ways in which parties understand and behave towards each other.<sup>10</sup> Of course, pursuing both levels of analysis is crucial in the conflict resolution process.

The conflict in Cyprus provides an example of how the subjective and objective elements of a conflict situation interact. There are core issues such as sovereignty and issues involving scarce resources such as the allocation of territory; the two communities generally have mutually exclusive preferred solutions regarding these issues. At the same time, the parties define their separate identities with the oppositional labels of religion, ethnicity, etc. which embraces larger cultural divisions of history and heritage. Thus, at one level, the root of the conflict lies in objective political issues such as territorial sovereignty. However, the objective aspect of the conflict is embedded in layers of subjective considerations such as the history of the two communities as descendants of separate indigenous and settler cultures in the island and the polarizing and alienating effects of violence since the 1950s.

As mentioned above, the following study involves an overview of the critical junctures and significant resolution-seeking efforts in the Cyprus conflict. In assessing these junctures, we shall touch upon both the objective and subjective aspects of the conflict. However, first we have to give a brief account of the history of the island because conflict analysis and resolution requires a history-sensitive approach, for without understanding the historical roots of a conflict, its resolution will be far from achievable.

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<sup>10</sup> University of Bradford, Centre for Conflict Resolution,  
[www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/body\\_unit1.html](http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/body_unit1.html)

## CHAPTER II

### BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

Objectivity is an ideal of the field of history, but subjectivity is often its greatest flaw. Especially complex history, as in the case of Cyprus, is prone to biases and entails competing, contradicting narratives. We often witness the “tool” of history being utilized to strengthen collective identity of a social group, causing further polarization between/among groups. Hence, conflicting narratives of history generally becomes an intricate part of the conflict itself, and the case of Cyprus is no exception.

As Dood states, perhaps the principle reason for the Cyprus dispute is each side’s intense historical memory and conviction that history has done it an injustice; it is not the record of history that is so important as the elements of it that each side accentuates to justify its own present position.<sup>11</sup> Hence we can state that history and collective memory of the Cypriot people act as an immense hurdle on the way to reconciliation.

Each side’s collective memory and perception of history has resulted in a phenomenon of “two histories” in Cyprus. To characterize the two histories very briefly it can be said that the Turkish Cypriots cannot forget the period between 1960 to 1963, whereas the Greek Cypriots do not want to remember those times. For them history and the ethnic conflict are fixed on the year 1974.<sup>12</sup> We will of course elaborate on these dates in the following chapters. It should also be stressed that for the purposes of this study, we will deal with the second half of the twentieth century, however, before we proceed some basic facts and important points should be underlined briefly about the earlier part of Cypriot history.

The island of Cyprus is 9,521 km<sup>2</sup> located in the Eastern Mediterranean, approximately 70 km south of Turkey, strategically based at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa (see Appendix I). As former Greek Cypriot President Clerides stated “most nations from Europe who wanted to conquer Africa or Asia stepped over Cyprus, and most Asian nations who wanted to conquer European countries, again, stepped over Cyprus.”<sup>13</sup> For most of the past five thousand years the island has been raided, settled, and often occupied by Phoenicians, Assyrians, Arabs, Greeks, Normans, Franks, Genovese, Venetians, Ottomans, and British. The Turks conquered Cyprus from the Venetians in 1571 and after years of

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<sup>11</sup> Dood, Clement H., *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*, Eothen Press, 1999, pg. 1

<sup>12</sup> Axt, Heinz-Jurgen., *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*, Eothen Press, 1999, pg. 188

<sup>13</sup> Clerides, Glafcos, *Impediments to the Solution of the Cyprus Problem*, Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer/Fall 2000, pg.15

subordination to the Latins, the Greek Orthodox Church was liberated under Ottoman rule.<sup>14</sup> The Turks ruled until 1878 when through a bilateral treaty Britain took over the administration in return of alliance against a possible Russian threat to Turkey. This is important, for it represents the initiation of British involvement in Cyprus. The British later, in 1914, annexed the island, which was not recognized by Turkey until 1923, with the Treaty of Lausanne. Another implication that the Lausanne Treaty holds was that through this treaty a massive and compulsory population exchange was agreed on between Turkey and Greece, which Cyprus was left out off, due to the aforementioned fact that Turkey had handed over the sovereignty of the island to the British.<sup>15</sup> While it is difficult to say what the case would have been if Cyprus was included in this population exchange deal, there is a high possibility that its future would be similar to that of Crete, an island with mixed Greek-Turkish population which united with Greece in 1913 as a result of the Balkan Wars.<sup>16</sup>

The case of Crete is noteworthy because of the similarities it had with Cyprus and more importantly, because the fate of the two islands turned out to be so different. For the Greek side, Crete is\was a success story of Hellenizing an island with a sizable Turkish minority, and for the Turks, it represents\represented Greek intentions in the region and specifically Enosis (union with Greece) for Cyprus, which is evident from the common nationalist slogan of “Cyprus will not be another Crete!” The interchangeable present and past tenses above are used to emphasize the differing points of view today within each community about whether there is an ongoing effort for Enosis (or at least an effort to eliminate the Turkish Cypriot minority) or not.

These contradicting views lie at the heart of the Cyprus problem, for decades of inter-communal unrest has been revolving around the question of whether the Turkish Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots can *coexist* as an *independent* nation-state or not. Independent coexistence requires at least some sense of statehood and nationhood, but Cyprus failed to achieve either one. Social relations between the two identity groups, who lived in mixed villages and towns for decades, were harmonious<sup>17</sup> and there was a good degree of economic interdependence,

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<sup>14</sup> The Greek Orthodox Church was reactivated through certain rights and privileges: Firstly, bishops were allowed to return and preach and an Archbishop was pronounced and acted as spokesman of his community. Gradually more responsibility and rights were granted, such as the right to impose and raise taxes.

<sup>15</sup> The population exchange entailed the movement of Greeks out of Anatolia, and Turks out of Crete and the rest of Greece (except Western Thrace). The exceptions staying behind were guaranteed minority rights by both Greece and Turkey.

<sup>16</sup> According to a poll conducted in 1868, which counted only the male population, Crete’s population was constituted of 15.000 Muslims and 40.000 Christians (%37.5 Muslim); the proportion of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus in the 1950s was just under %20 (*Girit oyunu ve Kıbrıs*, Akdeniz Haber Ajansı Yayınları, Nov. 2000, Vol. 11).

<sup>17</sup> Axt, Heinz-Jurgen., *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*, Eothen Press, 1999, pg. 188

but an underlying difference of religion was prevalent and prevented a higher degree of interaction, such as intermarriage. Moreover, a sense of being Cypriot was lacking, and instead a “stronger identity was attached to their ethnic groups and to the two nations that nurtured them; this set the stage for an identity-based conflict of significant intensity.”<sup>18</sup> By the time Cyprus started gaining international attention in the late 1950s due to the steadily increasing social turmoil, it should have been evident that the decolonization and state-engineering process in the island would be far from easy.

### **Moving towards Independence: 1950-1959**

The Cyprus of the 1950s exuded increasing inter-communal discord, paralleled by a steadily increasing tension mounting due to a lack of effective resolution-seeking efforts on the part of Britain. There were some efforts to stir up discussions of a Cypriot constitution for a possible Cypriot State but these “efforts failed as a result of, firstly, the British failure to produce a credible and workable proposal for constitutional advance, and, secondly, the relentless hostility of the Ethnarchy.”<sup>19</sup> It is needless to remind that Greece was a core area of sovereignty, and the more Cyprus’ colonial status was prolonged, the idea of Enosis gained wider support among the Greek-Cypriots. From 1951 onwards, resort to “forceful methods was advocated by irredentists such as Kyprianos of Kyrenia and the quasi-professional Enosist circle in Athens” and when the widely supported Archbishop Makarios III, leader of the Greek Cypriots, took an “oath to support Enosis unto death” in the early 1950s, the line of action that the Greek Cypriot would follow became apparent.<sup>20</sup> Makarios’ line of action is used synonymously with that of the Greek Cypriot community not simply because he was the leader but because he had an overwhelming influence and control over the community. According to Zenon Stavrinides’s account in the mid-1970s, Makarios “controlled the Church, and through Church organization and funds he extended his control over existing right-wing parties, trade unions, farmers’ associations, village clubs, athletic clubs and the teaching community.”<sup>21</sup>

The climbing unrest in Cyprus during the 1950s had to be met by some sort of British interference and formulation of a resolution, or at least the prospect of a resolution. In this respect, a conference was convened in London in 1955, where the British Foreign Secretary

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<sup>18</sup> Fisher, Roland J., *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, Journal of Peace Research, 2001, Vol. 38, pg. 308.

<sup>19</sup> Stefanidis, Ioannis. *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, New York University Press, 1999, pg. 243.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid*, pg. 245

<sup>21</sup> Stavrinides, Zenon, *The Cyprus Conflict*, Cyprus Research & Publishing Centre, Lefkoşa, 1999, pg. 25

Harold Macmillan proposed a gradual shift to self-government. However, the idea and form of “resolution” varied depending on the party involved. On the one hand, the Greek Cypriots were pushing for self-determination but the idea of self-determination had become synonymous with the idea of Enosis at the time; with the combination of the aforementioned Greek-Cypriot devotion to Enosis and the overwhelming Greek-Cypriot majority, no doubt the “dictatorship of the majority” would prevail, and this would be in the form of Enosis. The Turkish Cypriots along with mainland Turkey, on the other hand, did not want to dissolve the British sovereignty in the island (at least in the short run or until the Turkish Cypriot rights were secured), for such a change in the status quo carried a danger of Enosis. The Turkish Cypriot alignment with colonial ruler Britain, in this respect, earned them the reputation of “collaborators” and thus pushed the two communities further apart. In view of these incompatible views and approaches to forms of resolution it is needless to say that the London conference, and other reconciliation efforts, such as the Radcliff Proposal (1956) resulted in failure.<sup>22</sup>

The formation of the underground Greek Cypriot organization of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was a manifestation of the devotion to Enosis. EOKA, headed by a Greek colonel George Grivas, gained momentum in 1955 with the consent of Makarios, and steadily increased its violent activities; these activities paralleled Makarios’ view that “Britain never set any people free unless forced to do so by violent means.”<sup>23</sup> Of course, the aforementioned failure of the London Conference added nothing but fuel to the movement. EOKA “conducted operations against British installations, assassinated Greek Cypriot collaborators, and then-after the Turkish Cypriots began to assert themselves against enosis in 1958- turned its violent methods against them.”<sup>24</sup> Despite the fact that EOKA atrocities cannot be justified, we should point out that initially the Turkish minority was not the main target of this movement, but rather the colonial power of Britain and the Greek Cypriots who “collaborated” with the latter were targeted. When the British responded with fines, searches, arrests and “general harassment of the Greek population”<sup>25</sup> this gave incentive to Greeks to turn inwards and unite. A closer and firmer union within one group generally means further isolation and exclusion from other groups, and this is what happened between the Greek and Turkish communities.

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<sup>22</sup> Lord Radcliff, a constitutional expert was appointed in 1956 to prepare proposals for a new Cyprus Constitution based on full, self-government.

<sup>23</sup> Stefanidis, Ioannis. *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, New York University Press, 1999, pg. 242.

<sup>24</sup> Stavrinides, Zenon, *The Cyprus Conflict*, Cyprus Research & Publishing Centre, Lefkoşa, 1999, pg. 28-30

<sup>25</sup> *ibid*, pg 27

The reaction of the Turkish Cypriots to the enosis movement was a call for partition into two separate communities (*taksim*) and the formation of the TNT (Turkish Defense Organization), which advocated *taksim*.<sup>26</sup> In addition, as the intensity of Greek Cypriot opposition to British authority grew, the latter's dependence on the Turkish community increased. As a result, the British used Turkish Cypriots to build up the police and a special constabulary to form a mobile reserve, which further strengthened the "we" versus "them" syndrome. There was simply a very high rate of escalating tension between the two communities.

Perhaps the most destructive conflict dynamic is escalation. Its explosive cycle of provocation and counter-provocation eventually results in the replacement of substantive debate with increasingly hateful and sometimes violent confrontations directed more at hurting opponents than advancing interests.<sup>27</sup> Escalation can also contribute to polarization, a process which greatly expands the scope of the conflict. Needless to say, this is what happened in the Cyprus conflict; a Turkish Cypriot would be killed in an instance of EOKA violence and this would be countered by the Turkish Cypriots; escalating tension gradually pulled more and more people into mutual distrust and ultimately extreme polarization. Hence, the late 1950s was dominated by the activities of these two organizations and can be characterized by a vicious circle of attacks, counter attacks and short-lived cease-fire proclamations.

The ongoing turmoil had wearied the British by the late 1950s and they started reconsidering their interests in the island; as US Under-Secretary under Lyndon Johnson stated "London had no longer the will or the resources to preside over such a quarrel."<sup>28</sup> The British began to realize that the survival of their bases no longer required maintaining sovereignty over Cyprus.<sup>29</sup> Prime Minister Macmillan stated in 1957 that Britain does not "need more than an airfield on long lease or in sovereignty. Then the Turks and the Greeks could divide the rest of the island between them."<sup>30</sup> The changing attitude of the British, leaning towards the idea of partition, was taken as a threat on the part of the Greek Cypriots. Independence seemed to be a better option than partition, which meant the eternal loss of a section of the island to the Turks and hence, for the first time, Makarios indicated that he

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<sup>26</sup> Turkish Defense Organization is referred to as "Turkish Terrorist Organization" in some Greek Cypriot sources

<sup>27</sup> University of Colorado, [www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/essay/con\\_conf.htm](http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/essay/con_conf.htm)

<sup>28</sup> Ball, George W., *The Past Has Another Pattern*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982, pg. 340

<sup>29</sup> Bruce, Leigh H., *Cyprus: A Last Chance*, Foreign Policy, No. 58, Spring 1985, pg. 121

<sup>30</sup> Kyle, Keith, "The Main Narrative," [www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm)

would accept independence for Cyprus rather than union with Greece; this paved the way to the independence of 1960.

### **Independence and the Road to Crisis: 1960-1963**

The sovereign independent state of Cyprus was born by virtue of a constitution and three treaties- the Treaty of Alliance, the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee- forged by the agreements in Zurich and London (1959) and came into effect in August 1960. These arrangements among Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities produced a bi-communal constitutional framework which recognized the equality of the two communities in many important matters and a large degree of political and cultural separateness. The constitution established political partnership between the two communities through institutions of a national legislature and two communal chambers, a cabinet, public service, police force and an army in which Turkish Cypriots enjoyed representation at a higher level (30-40%) than their proportion in the population (18%). In addition, separate municipal administrations, acknowledging the mutual autonomy of the two communities, were set-up.

The President of the new Cyprus Republic was to be Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot. In accordance with this, Makarios became the first President and Dr. Fazıl Küçük, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, was named the Vice-President. Legislative authority, on the other hand, was vested in a House of Representatives, of whom 70% would be Greek Cypriots and 30% Turkish Cypriots, but legislation and executive action on specific matters, such as foreign affairs, required the concurrence of both the President and Vice-President. They, and the members of Parliament, were to be elected by members of their own community, so as to prevent dominion of Greek Cypriots (since they were the majority) over the government and state.

The constitution was backed by the aforementioned set of treaties which established two sovereign British military bases and allowed the stationing of small contingents by Greece and Turkey (the Treaty of Alliance). The Treaty of Guarantee, on the other hand, gave a legal right to Britain, Greece and Turkey to intervene militarily to guarantee and secure the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. These treaties in effect prohibited both enosis and partition of Cyprus, thus trying to safeguard against the solutions advocated for the Cyprus problem by the Greek and Turkish extremists respectively.

While the legal, administrative, political and social dynamics of Cyprus was governed and protected by these arrangements, whether the consent and will that was needed for them



to work existed is highly doubtful. Makarios, in a speech in July 1960 (and in a number of other speeches, later) revealed that the “the agreements do not form the goal- they are the present and not the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their national cause and shape their future in accordance with *their will*..[furthermore,]..until this Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated”<sup>31</sup> The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, were satisfied with the arrangements, firstly because enosis was prohibited and secondly because they were well represented with secured rights. However, regardless of whether it is justified or not, the dissatisfaction of one party in a contract is enough to destroy it.

Along with the birth of independent Cyprus disputes between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots started over constitutional matters and steadily increased, thus escalating friction between the communities. As in the words of Wolfe, “from its creation the new regime showed all the signs of succumbing to immobility.”<sup>32</sup> In 1959, even before the Cypriot government assumed power, the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research had reported that “there are dangers inherent not only in the comparative rigidity of the structure of the new state but also in the detailed codification of community rights which will tend to perpetuate rather than eliminate the communal cleavages,”<sup>33</sup> which soon became a reality. However, the same report also indicates that it was “doubtful that the bitterness created by communal strife in Cyprus would have made a more generalized solution acceptable.” We thus have a *paradox* in our hands, where the only possible set of arrangements and agreements that could bring the two communities together was bound to fail.

## **Prelude to the Turkish Intervention:**

### **Crises of 1963 and 1967**

Disputes regarding constitutional provisions, which are explained in greater detail in Appendix II, ranged from tax issues to employment ratios in public services. This situation, which resembled a tug of war, continued until 1963, when Makarios took a drastic step and demanded amendments to 13 articles of the constitution which would undermine the autonomy and representation of Turkish Cypriots. This proposition was outright rejected and

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<sup>31</sup> Stephen, Michael, *The Cyprus Question*, London, Jan. 2000, pg.11

<sup>32</sup> Wolfe, James H., *A Historical Review of the Dispute, Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations*, ed. Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. Mc.Donald, Washington, DC: Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, 1986, pg. 110

<sup>33</sup> Intelligence Report No. 8047, Analysis of the Cyprus Agreement, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1 July 1959, pg. 18

shortly after, inter-communal violence broke out, leading to further separation and segregation. The Greek Cypriots argue that the Turks used the proposed amendments as an excuse to put into effect their long prepared plan for partition.<sup>34</sup> The Turks on the other hand, see the developments of this period as an attempt for enosis, and rightfully point to the Greek Cypriot Akritas Plan,<sup>35</sup> which was a plan drawn up by the Greek Cypriot leadership that conspired to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus through pre-determined stages and methods, one of which was the creation of an underground army, and ultimately achieve union with Greece. According to Castleberry's account in 1964, the events in the early 1960s indicated that "the Greek Cypriots were carefully organized to use force against the Turks"<sup>36</sup> and although the TMT tried to organize the defense of the latter "the destructive effects of this period fell mainly on the Turkish Cypriots."<sup>37</sup> This horrendous period is commonly remembered by the event of "Bloody Christmas," (December 21, 1963) in which EOKA attacks resulted in the bombing of mosques and slaughter of more than 200 Turkish Cypriots. The violent events of 1963/1964 were "not the responsibility of the Greek Colonels of 1974 or an unrepresentative handful of Greek Cypriot extremists. The persecution of the Turkish Cypriots was an act of *policy* on the part of the Greek Cypriot political and religious leadership."<sup>38</sup>

Once again intervention was necessary by the guarantor powers, thus the British Government convened a conference in London on January 1964. The three guarantor states, along with representatives of the two communities, discussed the political status of the island and produced propositions. The Greek Cypriots demanded the termination of the 1960 agreements and the establishment of a unitary state, where the special rights granted to Turkish Cypriots would be replaced by minority rights. The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand demanded a revision of the treaties which would give them a chance to establish a bi-zonal federation. They saw partition as the sole alternative if a federation was not accepted. As expected, both sides rejected each other's demands and the conference broke down.

After the failure of the London Conference, the situation in the island further deteriorated and the necessity of UN intervention became evident. On March 1964 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution for the dispatch of a Peace-Keeping Force to Cyprus (UNFICYP), "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to

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<sup>34</sup> Hellenic Resource Network, <http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus-Problem/p-partition.html>

<sup>35</sup> This top secret document was first published by a local Greek newspaper- *patris* – on 21 April 1966

<sup>36</sup> Castleberry, H. Paul, *Conflict Resolution and the Cyprus Problem*, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3, Supplement Sept. 1964, pg 121

<sup>37</sup> Fisher, Roland J., *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, Journal of Peace Research, 2001, Vol. 38, pg. 310.

<sup>38</sup> Stephen, Michael, *The Cyprus Question*, London, Jan. 2000, pg.19

contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”<sup>39</sup>

The UN presence in the island achieved some degree of security but was unable to deter continuing hostility and increasing segregation between the two communities. As a UNFICYP official, Dr. Richard Patrick put it, the UN “could not kill Cypriots to prevent them from killing each other.”<sup>40</sup> Aside from the inability to end the violence, the joint peace keeping force also proved incapable of ending the illegal entrance of Greek troops into the island: “a few months after the arrival of UNFICYP more than 15,000 Greek troops were smuggled into the island under the guise of tourists and students.”<sup>41</sup> The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, organized militarily under the TMT.<sup>42</sup>

Although the division of Cyprus is usually affiliated with the Turkish intervention of 1974, the de facto division of the island and the mutual exclusiveness of the two communities was a reality in the early 1960s. The Turkish Cypriots were concentrated in enclaves, governed by a provisional government headed by Küçük and defended by fighter units organized under Turkish military officers, all of which resembled a state within a state. The violence between the two communities, which had polarized and physically separated the two communities to a large degree, was also mirrored in the Cypriot government (if it can be called a “government”). The so-called government was in the hands of Greek Cypriots, “because Turkish Cypriot representatives like their counterparts in the civil service, feared for their safety and did not participate.”<sup>43</sup> Greek Cypriots, however, claim that the Turks willingly chose non-participation. Of course, as with most part of Cypriot history, there are conflicting views on this story as well. Turkish Cypriots argue that there was no legal government in Cyprus at the time. What was at hand, according to the Turks, was solely provisional bodies of both sides pending the establishment of a new legal order, the old one having been overthrown by force. According to the Greek Cypriot however, there continued to be a legitimate and democratically elected Government representing the great majority of the people and that the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and ministers willfully continued to absent themselves.

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<sup>39</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 186

<sup>40</sup> Kyle, Keith, “The Main Narrative,” [www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm)

<sup>41</sup> Denktas, Rauf R., *The Cyprus Triangle*, George Allen & Unwin Pub., 1982, pg. 31

<sup>42</sup> There was a Turkish scheme to intervene in Cyprus in 1964 but this was hindered by the famous “Johnson Letter” (June 5, 1964) which harshly criticized any such attempt. As a result, Turkey retreated from the idea of intervention, but this, as we shall see below was just a postponement.

<sup>43</sup> Solsten, Eric, *Cyprus: A Country Study*, 4th ed. Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1993, pg. 170

The disorder and anarchic atmosphere of this period, and especially the deprivation of the Turkish Cypriots, can be seen through the UN reports and documents. The economic loss of the Turkish Cypriots in this period was very high; “in addition to the losses incurred in agriculture and in industry during the first part of the year [1964], the Turkish Cypriots had lost other sources of its income including the salaries of over 4000 persons who were employed by the Cypriot government”<sup>44</sup> In addition, the freedom of movement of the Turkish Cypriots was severely restricted.<sup>45</sup> The UN Secretary General reported on September 1964 that “the economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish Cypriot communities, which in some instances has been so severe as to amount to veritable siege, indicated that the Government of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure.”<sup>46</sup>

The turmoil of this period was followed by mediation efforts under UN auspices. The Acheson Plan was proposed to Turkey and Greece, which would give Cyprus the choice of independence or union with Greece in exchange for the cession of Meis (Kastellorizon)<sup>47</sup> to Turkey and a sovereign Turkish base on the Karpaz peninsula. According to the plan, Turkish Cypriots would be given two-three areas with local self-administration and an international commissioner would reside in Cyprus to observe any acts of discrimination. Although the plan was initially accepted by both Greece and Turkey, Makarios’ opposition to the plan and the general Greek view that it was “partition masquerading in the rhetoric of enosis”<sup>48</sup> did not allow the plan to fall through. The plan was then revised in favor of the Greek Cypriot side, which foresaw *leasing* a base to Turkey rather than *ceding*, but this in return was rejected by the Turkish side.

UN mediation attempts continued through the efforts of Galo Plaza, former president of Ecuador. Plaza rejected the Greek and Turkish Cypriot cases for self determination and federation respectively and instead recommended a unitary constitutional system embodying provisions securing minority rights for the latter. In his report, Plaza expressed a personal conviction that the 1960 treaties and constitution were the main cause of the Cyprus dispute. Because this was the propaganda line used by the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish side felt that Plaza had “irretrievably damaged his role as a mediator and set out to become a pro-Greek

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<sup>44</sup> UN doc. 5950

<sup>45</sup> UN doc. S/5764, S/5950, S/7001, S/7350

<sup>46</sup> UN doc. 5950

<sup>47</sup> An eastern Mediterranean island 6 km off the coast of Turkey and more than 500 km from mainland Greece.

<sup>48</sup> Kyle, Keith, “The Main Narrative,” [www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm)

arbitrator.”<sup>49</sup> Hence, the Plaza report failed to contribute to a settlement of the Cyprus dispute and the mediation effort petered out.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s several other negotiation attempts were pursued but all ended in failure. In 1967 democracy and government in Greece was toppled and taken over by a group of colonels. In the wake of their newly won leadership, the Greek junta made a secret offer to the Turks in return for permission of Enosis for Cyprus. This proposition was most likely along the lines of the Acheson plan and shared the fate of its predecessor, failing to solve the dispute over Cyprus. In the meantime Grivas, of course backed by the Greek junta, was getting ready to make a dramatic entrance into the scene. Arguing that Turkish Cypriots’ access to the coastline should be cut-off, he launched attacks in November to Ayios Theodoros and the village of Getcikale/Kophinou where 28 Turkish Cypriot civilians were killed, many wounded and about 50 houses were destroyed.<sup>50</sup> The UN forces proved to be incapable of intervening and stopping such outbreaks of violence.<sup>51</sup> Turkey’s response was prompt; they gave an ultimatum to the junta to recall Grivas and retract their excess troops from Cyprus. The ultimatum and the threat of the Turkish troops which were mobilized on the Greco-Turkish border, caused the junta to take a step back and withdraw the notorious Grivas along with some 12,000 Greek troops. In addition, by March 1968 economic restrictions were withdrawn from the Turkish enclaves. This gesture however was not reciprocated by the Turkish Cypriots who continued to maintain their road blocks in order to bar Greek Cypriots from their enclaves. The Turkish Cypriot administration stated that the blockade would be lifted “provided that the Greek Cypriots traveling through Turkish Cypriot areas would agree to abide by local regulations in exactly the same way that Turkish Cypriots were expected to do so when traveling in Greek areas.”<sup>52</sup> The Greek Cypriots rejected this demand and thus the blockade continued. Makarios, on the other hand, failed to dissolve the National Guard with its officers from Greece and its intense anti-communist indoctrination, and he blocked any increase in the UN force.

Since 1964, Makarios had consistently refused to meet the Turkish Cypriots unless they agreed to discuss the issue of minority rights but the aforementioned events brought pressure from the UN, USA and Britain to initiate talks between the two communities. Inter-communal talks began between Rauf Denktaş and Glafcos Clerides on June 1968 in Beirut and continued in Cyprus. Denktaş expressed willingness to accept the thirteen amendment

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<sup>49</sup> Denktaş, Rauf R., *The Cyprus Triangle*, George Allen & Unwin Pub., 1982, pg. 33

<sup>50</sup> Stephen, Michael, *The Cyprus Question*, London, Jan. 2000, pg. 25

<sup>51</sup> An account of the Kophinou attack can be found in UN Secretary General’s report No. S/8248 and S/8286

<sup>52</sup> Denktaş, Rauf R., *The Cyprus Triangle*, George Allen & Unwin Pub., 1982, pg. 53

proposal of Makarios which had triggered the crisis of 1963. In return, he wanted new provisions in the constitution to grant Turkish Cypriots local autonomy. In addition, guarantee against Enosis or union with any other country was demanded.

There was considerable discrepancy about the degree of autonomy that the two sides envisioned. The Greeks insisted that a state administrative supervision was necessary whereas the Turkish Cypriots wanted minimum intervention and maximum autonomy. Turkish Cypriots wanted villages and municipalities to be run by councils with independent powers, duties and jurisdiction and these to be subordinated only to the appropriate Greek or Turkish members of the House of Representatives. The Greek councils would be dealt with by the Greek side of the House, the Turkish councils by the Turkish side and the councils for mixed villages by whichever side possessed the majority of their population.

The talks dragged on for two years with exchanges of views on constitutional matters and the degree of autonomy but resulted in failure towards the end of 1971. “This was the one period which the Greek Cypriots could have escaped the Turkish Cypriot vocabulary of federal equality for the two communities, but the opportunity was missed.”<sup>53</sup>

The failure of negotiations over the Cyprus issue during these years, and throughout its history of negotiation, should not be tied to a single factor. No matter how positive the intentions of the negotiators, the outcome ultimately depends on the political support they receive. On the part of Clerides, his commitment for an agreement was being “persistently undermined by local critics and not always supported by his own government which itself was being undermined by Athens.”<sup>54</sup> This was evident in Clerides’ resignation attempts on more than one occasion. The unstable politics of the Greek Cypriots, and parallel to this, the steadily deteriorating relations between Makarios and the Greek junta, was not a climate suitable for negotiations.

To begin with, Makarios was a royalist and supported the king exiled by the Greek junta. In return, the military government of Greece backed a group in Cyprus called the National Front which consistently accused Makarios of betraying Hellenism. Despite the fact that Makarios kept announcing his devotion to Enosis,<sup>55</sup> the Greek government saw him as a threat to Greek interests. The friction between the two parties turned into open hostility and went as far as attempting to assassinate Makarios himself (by shooting down his helicopter),

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<sup>53</sup> Kyle, Keith, “The Main Narrative,” [www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm)

<sup>54</sup> *ibid*

<sup>55</sup> In a speech on March 1971 Makarios stated that “Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of history and it will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over, Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece.” (Denktas, Rauf R., *The Cyprus Triangle*, George Allen & Unwin Pub., 1982, pg. 55)

which he narrowly escaped. In the meantime Grivas returned to Cyprus and formed the EOKA B, which added fuel to the turmoil of intra-Greek relations. He too denounced the Greek Cypriot leadership under Makarios and despite the reconciliation attempts of the two men,<sup>56</sup> Grivas' death brought an end to any such aspiration. EOKA B came under the direct control of the junta and as Clerides pointed out, Makarios was now fighting on three fronts—the Greek junta, EOKA B and the Turks.<sup>57</sup>

### **The Coup and Intervention**

The junta's rising opposition towards Makarios' leadership ultimately culminated into a coup. On 15 July, 1974 the National Guard led by Greek officers overthrew the Greek Cypriot government and installed as 'President' Nicos Sampson, who was an ex-EOKA terrorist and one of the leading characters of the 1963 massacres. Ecevit, who was the newly elected Prime Minister of Turkey, acted hastily. He urged the British to intervene by proposing a joint Anglo-Turkish action under the Treaty of Guarantee, but got no positive response. The UK House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus concluded that "Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons which the [Labor] government refuses to give."<sup>58</sup>

Britain's lack of political will left Turkey alone in the face of inescapable military intervention. Turkey sent Athens an ultimatum calling for the resignation of Sampson, the withdrawal of Greek officers and the restoration of Cypriot independence, but unlike in the crisis of 1967, the junta did not yield. Ecevit, acting under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, went forward with intervention and thus began the 'Peace Operation.'

The Turkish armed forces initially secured a corridor reaching Nicosia, constituting approximately %8 of the island's territory. The following month, in August, a conference was convened in Geneva, where the guarantor powers and Cypriot communities attended. When this diplomatic effort failed Turkey went ahead with a second offensive, occupying approximately %37 of the northern part of the island. Ceasefire was proclaimed and a 'Green Line' extended across the length of the island, almost entirely separating the Greek and

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<sup>56</sup> Makarios and Grivas met and wrote to each other on several occasions in hopes of reconciliation. They outlined their goals for Cyprus and their methods for achieving them. However, it seems their common goal for Enosis was not matched by their methods. Grivas' desire for an immediate and swift military campaign idea (for Enosis) did not concur with Makarios' cautious and low-gear approach, and this prevented an agreement between the two men. (Clerides, Glafkos, Cyprus: My Deposition, Alithia Publishing Co. Ltd, 1990, Vol. III, pgs. 145-154.)

<sup>57</sup> Kyle, Keith, "The Main Narrative," [www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm)

<sup>58</sup> Stephen, Michael, The Cyprus Question, London, Jan. 2000, pg. 27

Turkish communities (except a few mixed villages)<sup>59</sup> and thus giving birth to two mono-ethnic zones.

The coup followed by the Turkish intervention in the year 1974 entailed the most dramatic and traumatic events of modern Cypriot history. Thousands of Greek and Turkish Cypriots were lost, killed and forced to uproot themselves from their homes and properties. Some 150,000 Greek Cypriots fled to the south (figures range from 102,000 to 200,000),<sup>60</sup> and by the end of the intervention were left with %63 of the island.

The atrocities of the time continue to be a matter of dispute. The Greek Cypriots collected records of 1619 missing people, half of them being civilians. It was claimed that there was definite evidence that they had been in Turkish hands and in some cases taken to the Turkish mainland.<sup>61</sup> The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, claim that some of these were killed during the intra-Greek violence during the coup against Makarios. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots point to the incidents of armed Greek Cypriot retaliation on Turkish Cypriot villagers. Accounts of massacres and mass graves point to intense Greek violence on civilians: “In the village of Tokhni on 14 August, 1974 all the Turkish Cypriot men between ages of 13 and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were taken away and shot.”<sup>62</sup> Similar accounts can be found about violence in Turkish Cypriot inhabited areas of Zyyi, Alaminos, Sandalaris, Maratha, and so forth.

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<sup>59</sup> Following the ceasefire of 1974, the two sides agreed on a population exchange deal whereby the remaining Greek and Turkish Cypriots moved to their ‘ethnic zones.’

<sup>60</sup> Dood, Celement, *Storm Clouds Over Cyprus*, Eothen Press, 2002, pg. 7

<sup>61</sup> Kyle, Keith, “The Main Narrative,” [www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm)

<sup>62</sup> Stephen, Michael, *The Cyprus Question*, London, Jan. 2000, pg. 29



## CHAPTER III

### CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS ATTEMPTS OVER A DIVIDED CYPRUS

#### Negotiations in the post-1974 Era

The Turkish Cypriot community, which was governing itself through a provisional government, as mentioned earlier, declared itself as the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ in 1975; this move was condemned by the UN through its Security Council Resolution 367. The Greek Cypriot administration, on the other hand, gained international recognition under the name of ‘Republic of Cyprus.’ The assumed title of the Turkish Cypriot administration incorporated the term ‘federated’ to imply that they were a unit waiting to get integrated into a federal republic. The idea of a federation was by this time more plausible and feasible because of the simple fact that the two communities were now geographically separated. It was in 1977 when the two leaders of the communities, Makarios and Denktas, met under UN auspices to discuss the creation of a federated republic.

As a result of the high level discussions, the Denktas-Makarios guidelines were established, where the latter tacitly accepted the idea of a bi-zonal federation on the grounds that the zone be accepted as a territorial entity. Four points were emphasized in the course of the agreements, which are briefly outlined below.

The primary point was that parties were to seek an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic. Secondly, the territory under the administration of each community was to be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership. This meant that territorial divisions would not be made according to population ratios. Third, questions of principles, like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and ownership was to be open to discussion by taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal state system, inferring sensitivity to Turkish Cypriot concerns. Finally, it was stressed that the powers and the functions of the central government should be such that the unity of the country would be safeguarded but would respect the state’s bi-communal character.<sup>63</sup>

Archbishop Makarios died a few months after the agreement, and so did the idea of reconciliation. Makarios’ death might have injured the negotiation process, but by no means was it the prime factor leading to failure. The last point of the guidelines captures the gist of the failure to compromise; while the Greek Cypriots wanted a *strong* central government as in

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<sup>63</sup> UN Secretary General’s report no. S/12323, 30 April, 1977

a unitary state, their counterpart strove for a *weak* central government, resembling a confederal structure.

When considering the negotiation and mediation efforts of the time, and for that matter any other time, we should put aside the disputes over constitutional, structural matters for a moment and reflect on the bigger picture. Remember that the island was prone to lashes of intense inter-communal violence since the 1950s. No matter how one interprets the Turkish intervention of 1974, it brought an end to violence; of course, two separate zones with minimum interaction carry minimum potential of violence. If the mediation efforts of the time were to succeed, the two communities would once again come into contact, whether it be under a weak confederal type administration or a strong unitary government. Of course, rights of citizens would be safeguarded under an agreement and/or treaties but the constitution of 1960 had already proven that lack of political will can hinder any real solution and bypass any agreement. Hence, each party approached its counterpart with caution and skepticism. The Turkish Cypriots felt a prevalent strive for enosis on the part of the Greeks, and the latter was threatened by the idea of partition. These were the concerns that lay at the heart of the *strong* vs *weak* government arguments, for the former gives maximum control to the central government over the Turkish Cypriots with a minimum risk of partition, and the latter gives maximum autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots with minimum risk of being prone to Greek Cypriot threat of enosis, which usually came in the form of violence. These were the worries that manifested themselves and played a central role in the failure of the negotiations of 1977, and in fact throughout the next decade, as we shall see in the following section.

Following the death of Makarios, Spyros Kyprianou, who was the President of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, assumed the Presidency. Kyprianou and Denktas came to an agreement over ‘ten-points,’ again under UN auspices, which established the parameters for resuming inter-communal talks.<sup>64</sup> The two parties agreed to proceed along the lines of the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines, but priority was to be given to the resettlement of the Greek Cypriot area of Varosha/Maraş, which was evacuated during the events of 1974.<sup>65</sup> This area was deemed significant by the Greek Cypriots because it was a highly developed and well populated district which served as a tourist paradise, housing many hotels and resorts.

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<sup>64</sup> For full account of the Ten Point Agreement see Appendix III

<sup>65</sup> Varosha, the southern suburb of Famagusta/Gazimagusa, is on the eastern end of the Green Line, which can be viewed on the map in Appendix I

Once again, disagreements hampered any progress on negotiations, and thus the deadlock persisted. The initial problem arose over the handling of Varosha; the Greek Cypriots wanted it to be treated as a priority, meaning that this matter should be settled before all else. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, wanted all the disputed matters to be dealt with as a whole. When the Turks finally came up with a proposal for Varosha, it was rejected by the Greeks, on the grounds that the proposal envisioned the area as being subordinated to the Turkish Cypriots through conditions such as border control.

### **Initiatives in the 1980s**

In 1980, inter-communal talks resumed under UN auspices and proceeded with each side producing more developed proposals on territorial and constitutional matters. As a result of the talks the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim presented an evaluation paper known as the Interim Agreement the following year which assessed the two respective proposals and incorporated suggestions on how to proceed. The proposal called for the reopening of Nicosia's international airport to civilian traffic, the placing of Varosha under UN administration, and the lifting of some %70 of the economic restrictions imposed by the 'Republic of Cyprus'/'Greek Cypriot administration' on the Turkish Cypriots. These, however, were details and their feasibility depended on the resolution of the dispute over the structure of the state, i.e. the dispute over federalism/strong central government vs. confederalism/weak or decentralized government, as noted above.

As pointed out in the Denktaş-Makarios guidelines, a 'federal republic' was sought, but the interpretation of 'federal' was substantially different for the two sides. According to the Greek Cypriot view, the federal state would comprise two federated states, one to be administered by the Greek Cypriots and the other by the Turkish Cypriots and there was to be no border between the two regions and the central government would need to have sufficient power to ensure its unity, as in classical federalism. As a concession to the Turkish Cypriots, they accepted bi-regionality instead of multi-regionality. The latter, which had been their original position, implied less of a divide between the two communities and hence lesser homogeneity and autonomy to the Turkish Cypriot side. Subsequently the term 'bi-zonal' was used by the Greek-Cypriot side as a synonym for 'bi-regional' and in contrast to 'multi-regional'. This term proved to be a controversial issue as the Greek Cypriots asserted that the Turkish Cypriot side had attached a different interpretation to the term than was originally accepted.

An account of an interview with Denktaş reveals the Turkish Cypriot understanding of bi-zonal federalism: The meaning of ‘bi-zonal’ is that I am a state that has territory as one of the two federated states. I am sovereign on many things within this territory. My sovereignty is absolute; no one can take it away from me.<sup>66</sup> The Turkish Cypriots argued that federation must be built from the basis of the existing two de facto administrations and that Cyprus should be a decentralized or weak federation in which the central government should not have powers to override the units. This obviously differed widely from the Greek Cypriots’ conception of a federation. “It was clear that the two sides continued to jockey for their desired positions on the federal-confederal continuum,”<sup>67</sup> thus bringing an end to the prospect of any positive outcome yet again.

Following Waldheim, Javier Perez de Cuellar, who had served as a special UN representative in Cyprus in the 1970s, was appointed as the UN Secretary-General. Perez was thus very much aware of the complexities and protracted nature of the Cyprus dispute and his appointment as Secretary-General brought a new prospect for the resolution of the Cyprus case. In 1983, he came forward with a set of suggestions, referred to as ‘indicators’ or ‘initiatives.’ His proposal entailed zones of compromise on major issues which aimed at narrowing down the points of divergence between the two parties, so that coming to a mutual understanding would be easier.

In regard of constitutional arrangements, Cuellar’s proposal envisioned a personal link between the federal government and the two provincial governments. Two options were presented for the executive branch: The presidency and vice-presidency would either be permanently held by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, respectively, or be rotated between them (the frequency of rotation was not specified).<sup>68</sup> In the first option, the ratio of the members of the Council of Ministers would be %60 to %40, in favor of the Greek side. Under the second option however, this ratio would tilt in favor of the Greeks (%70 to %30) during the Turkish Cypriot presidency.

As for the legislature, it was to be bicameral, comprising a lower chamber with representatives of the two communities in proportion to their population, and an upper chamber, hosting an equal number of representatives from each community. As envisioned in Waldheim’s Interim Agreement, there was to be 10 members from each community in the

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<sup>66</sup> Kyle, Keith, “The Main Narrative,” [www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm)

<sup>67</sup> Fisher, Roland J., *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, Journal of Peace Research, 2001, Vol. 38, pg. 315.

<sup>68</sup> The frequency of rotation was not specified, but would probably be along the lines envisioned by the latest Annan Plan (a maximum of 2 terms of presidency, each term being 10 months).

upper house, and one member per 10,000 of the total population would constitute the lower house. In addition, each community would vote for its own members in the parliament.

In regard to territorial arrangements, Cuellar proposed the return of some of the occupied areas by the Turks, thus reducing their zones from %37 to a maximum of %30 and a minimum of %23.

Perez de Cuellar's 'initiative' stirred disagreement within the Greek Cypriot government, which eventually led foreign minister Nicos Rolandis to give his resignation to President Kyprianou, the leading figure of opposition to Cuellar's set of proposals. The opposition, which was backed by the government in Athens, protested that the 'initiative' failed to recognize the right to free movement, right of settlement and right to property throughout the island. The 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, they said, should have the right to go back to their homes and live in their ancestral properties if they wished to do so.

The 'initiative' was ultimately rejected by the Greek Cypriot side, whereupon the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared their independence, on November 15, 1983, forming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). This act abruptly brought an end to the dragging talks between the two communities and attracted the harsh attention of the international community, specifically the UN. Just three days after the declaration, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 541, stating that the declaration of independence "is legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal" and also "calls upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus." TRNC was recognized only by Turkey itself, and this continues to be the case today.

### **Continued Impasse Following the Birth of TRNC**

In the wake of the dispute over the declaration of TRNC, Cuellar personally initiated shuttle diplomacy between the two sides, hoping ultimately to recommence talks between them. The Secretary-General urged the two parties to cooperate with him to full extent so as to achieve peaceful settlement.

Kyprianou took a step forward and submitted "a framework for a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus Problem" to Cuellar in January 1984; the framework proposal envisioned the formation of a genuine federation and the installation of an international force under UN auspices. The island would thus be free of military associated with any interested party, namely Greece and Turkey. In addition, peace and security would be buttressed by international guarantees, similar to those established in 1960, but different such that countries with no interest would be party to the guarantee. In regard to territorial matters, the plan

asserted the allocation of %25 of land to Turkish Cypriot control, provided that Famagusta and Morfou be returned to Greek Cypriots (see map). Finally, the plan called for a workable constitution and in this respect entailed certain suggestions. Firstly, the presidency would be held by the Greek Cypriots and the vice presidency by their counterpart; the council of ministers would be constituted of %70-%30 Greek and Turkish Cypriots, respectively. In regard of the legislature, although the proposal favored a unicameral structure, a bicameral one could also be tolerated, given that members of the lower chamber be determined through proportional representation and that representation in the upper chamber be determined depending on its functions, leaving room for discussions. The government of the federated republic would have power over foreign affairs, international communications, passports, customs and tariffs, etc. and the 'three freedoms' that the Greek Cypriots were very sensitive about were to be secured throughout the island.<sup>69</sup> Finally, there was to be a federal supreme court in which the two communities would have equal representation.

Upon receiving Kyprianou's proposal, Cuellar met Denktaş in March 1984. In addition to discussions over Kyprianou's proposal, Cuellar requested attempts seeking recognition of TRNC and its consolidation to be brought to an end. The Secretary-General introduced a 'five-point plan,'<sup>70</sup> which among other things emphasized the illegitimacy of TRNC and condemned any further step to internationalize the Cyprus problem.<sup>71</sup>

Cuellar's aim of bringing the two sides to the table was not facilitated by his five point plan. Though the Secretary-General was trying to find a 'golden mean' in pleasing the two sides, his plan was conceived as a condemnation of the TRNC and thus did not receive high esteem from the Turkish Cypriots, whereupon he presented a fresh set of ideas.

In August 1984, Cuellar introduced a set of 'working points,' known as the Vienna Working Points, which *finally* paved the way to the initiation of inter-communal talks. As in the preceding plan, the working points comprised five statements:

1. Famagusta to be put under UN control and the eventual return of Greek Cypriots to their homes in that city.
2. Reopening of Nicosia's international airport for use by both communities. This would be done under UN auspices but under Cypriot (both communities) administration.

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<sup>69</sup> As noted in the previous section, the supposed lack of Perez de Cuellar's 'initiative' to recognize the 'three freedoms,' namely the freedom of movement, the right of settlement and owning property, was claimed to be the main reason for its rejection on the part of the Greek Cypriots.

<sup>70</sup> See full account of Perez de Cuellar's 'five-points' in Appendix IV

<sup>71</sup> Following the events of 1974, the Greek Cypriot leadership followed a policy of internationalization of the Cyprus issue. Using the advantage of being recognized as the legitimate government, and their membership to international organizations such as the UN, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and recently the European Union, they strove to gain international support and ultimately exert pressure on TRNC and Turkey.

3. An immediate end to any further internationalization of the Cyprus problem by the Greek Cypriots and a simultaneous stop to Turkish Cypriots seeking recognition for TRNC.
4. Firm commitment by the leadership of both communities to the acceptance of the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979.
5. Agreement by both sides that a transitional government would implement any agreement reached and also workout the details of the federal constitution.

The working points gained positive response from both sides and thus began the long desired proximity talks. Of course, the deed of bringing the two sides to agree on starting proximity talks is a praiseworthy achievement in itself, however, we should emphasize that from the very start there were signs of discord. The Greek Cypriots, under the presidency of Kyprianou, exuded an air of uncertainty; “According to a Greek Cypriot daily, the president asked the Secretary-General to postpone a planned trip to Cyprus in September; it can only be guessed that Kyprianou was under conflicting pressure from various political groups that prolonged his indecision over the Working Points.”<sup>72</sup> Despite his reservations, Kyprianou responded positively, but this did not mean anything more than agreeing to *discuss* the working points, rather than *accepting* them.

### **Proximity Talks and Draft Agreement: 1984-1986**

The years through 1984 to 1986 entailed several rounds of proximity talks, high-level summits and the drafting and redrafting of framework agreements which, as we shall see below, failed to produce a positive outcome.

Following the aforementioned persistency of the Secretary-General, who formulated initiative after initiative, the two sides convened in New York, on September 1984, for the first round of proximity talks. Acting under the good offices of the UN, Cuellar suggested three headings which would determine the parameters of the discussions, namely, confidence-building measures, territorial adjustments, and the structure of the federal government. In addition, he proposed a re-commitment to the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 and the points agreed during inter-communal talks.

The Vienna Working points, which initiated the proximity talks, were not taken as a base during the talks, and instead a more detailed and complicated path was followed. The first round of talks was “through and businesslike,” as described in the words of Cuellar.<sup>73</sup> It entailed discussions over the substance of the Cyprus problem, the structure of the federal government being sought and the ‘three freedoms.’ Under the heading of confidence-building

<sup>72</sup> Kyle, Keith, “The Main Narrative,” [www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm)

<sup>73</sup> TRNC Prime Ministry Public Information Office

<http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/DOSYALAR/MAIN%20NEGOTIATIONS.htm>

measures, Cuellar proposed resettlement of Greek Cypriots in Famagusta, under UN auspices. In addition, he suggested the reopening of Nicosia's international airport, but all the discussions and propositions failed to produce any apparent progress, and thus ended the first round of talks

As the discussions in the first round were of a detailed and complicated nature, and failed to produce substantive progress, the Secretary-General presented an "Agenda for the Second Round of Proximity Talks," which probably aimed to provide a more general and concise outlook to the Cyprus problem in order to produce higher chances of success. The agenda, which was supposed to remain confidential among the involved parties, comprised two levels, one confirming the points already agreed to and the other highlighting points of divergence which were to be discussed.

According to press leaks, accounted by Farid Mirbagheri, the points already agreed by the parties included acceptance of the 1977 and 1979 High-Level Agreements, and the establishment at the earliest date of the federal republic of Cyprus, to be bi-communal in its constitution and bi-zonal in its territory. It also included acceptance of those constitutional points already agreed in the 1981-1983 inter-communal meetings: international representation of the Republic to be the function of the federal government, sovereignty to be exercised by the federal government on behalf both federated states and their respective territories, and the agreement on single citizenship afforded by the federal government. Points to be agreed were the powers and functions of the central government such as federal finance, foreign affairs, international transport, post and communications, defense and security, federal health paper.<sup>74</sup>

The little progress achieved in the first two rounds of the proximity talks was followed by a final round of talks where a preliminary draft for a high degree agreement was submitted to both sides. This draft was along the lines of the agenda presented by Cuellar during the second round. The Turkish Cypriot side declared that it was in full agreement with all the points of the draft, but their positive response was not reciprocated by the Greek Cypriots.

The three rounds of proximity talks failed to produce the outcome expected, but hopes had not faded just yet. Shortly after the conclusion of the third round, the two leaders Kyprianou and Denktas came together in New York, on January 1985, and held a high-level meeting. Once again, major issues of Cuellar's draft were addressed, leaving details to be handled by working groups. To the surprise and disappointment of the Secretary-General, however, the summit failed to produce a framework which laid down the principles for a federal

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<sup>74</sup> Mirbagheri, Farid, *Cyprus and International Peace Making*, C.Hurst & Co. London, 1998, pg. 129-130



solution. Cuellar stated that the Turkish Cypriot side “fully accepts the draft agreement” while the Greek Cypriot side accepted it “as a basis for a negotiation in accordance with the integrated whole approach aiming at a comprehensive and overall solution to the Cyprus problem.”<sup>75</sup> This meant that Kyprianou would endorse the document only as a basis for further negotiations, thus effectively rejecting the document and reopening all the major issues, such as the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, the ‘three freedoms,’ and international guarantees.<sup>76</sup>

The failure of the proximity talks and the summit in New York brought much criticism upon Kyprianou, not only from abroad but from within the Greek Cypriot community itself. The president was being blamed for his inflexible approach to the talks by the right-wing party DISY and the communist AKEL, and especially by former foreign minister Rolandis, who, as mentioned above, had resigned from Kyprianou’s government in 1983. Below is an excerpt from his open letter to Kyprianou:

I am happy neither with the New York melodrama, with its multitude of substantial statements, nor with the resulting confusion and misunderstanding...Have you not, by your actions at the proximity talks and after, opened the door for Denktaş to create new fait accomplish...You have no right to play on the future of Cyprus the unacceptable tricks you have played on the political parties.<sup>77</sup>

Following the summit in New York, there ensued a one year period of redrafting and further high-level proximity talks. In April 1985 a version of the draft was accepted by the Greek Cypriots but this time rejected by their counterpart. Between March and June of the same year, TRNC was going through a phase of consolidation; their constitution was put in referendum and parliamentary elections were held. The rejection of the new draft was most probably a tactic to gain time because further consolidation not only caused uproar among the Greek Cypriots, giving justification to the hardliners’ position in the south, but in the mean time gave rise to the prospect of a true ‘Turkish Cypriot state,’ which put pressure on the Greek Cypriots to be more conciliatory. Tactics and strategies to gain an upper hand, whether it be on the Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot part, took place at the cost of a solution.

After extensive consultations, a new draft was promulgated, in March 1986, which was in fact very similar to that of the proposals presented in the New York summit of January 1985. The new draft, called the ‘Draft Framework Agreement,’ “differed in tone on the uneasy formula equating the Greek Cypriots’ concession over the powers of the central

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<sup>75</sup> TRNC Prime Ministry Public Information Office

<http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/DOSYALAR/MAIN%20NEGOTIATIONS.htm>

<sup>76</sup> Bruce, Leigh H., *Cyprus: A Last Chance*, Foreign Policy, No. 58, Spring 1985, pg. 115

<sup>77</sup> Full text of the letter is available, TRNC Public Information, [www.pubinfo.gov.nc.tr/anti.htm](http://www.pubinfo.gov.nc.tr/anti.htm)

government with the Turkish-Cypriots' concession over the amount of territory they would part with.”<sup>78</sup>

The Draft Framework Agreement foresaw the drafting of new defense treaties, thus leaving the issues of security and defense to be discussed in later negotiations. The proposals for the legislature were parallel to those proposed in January 1985, except it was stated that important matters would require separate majorities for each community represented in the parliament. The ‘three freedoms,’ which had played a big part in prior negotiations, would get special attention in that a working group was to be assigned to discuss and come to an agreement over them. In addition, a timetable was to be scheduled for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops, namely, Turkish, Greek and British. Furthermore, the territory to be under the federated zone of the Turkish Cypriot community was foreseen to be at least %29, which is why the framework came to be known as “The 29 Percent-Plus.”

This proposal was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots as an integrated whole in which no one agreement is binding until the entire document is agreed upon. However, it was the Greek Cypriots this time that rejected the document. The Greek Cypriot administration felt that the new draft deviated from the formerly accepted draft and their main objections, as accounted by Mirbagheri, were as follows:

1. It ignored the criterion of the number of refugees to return to their homes, thus blocking the way to a fair settlement of the territorial problem.
2. It accorded full political equality to the Turkish Cypriot minority of 18 per cent with the Greek Cypriot majority of 80 per cent without the corresponding balance in the government structure.
3. It provided for Turkish Cypriot vetoes on all matters both in the Executive and the Legislative, without adequate deadlock-resolving mechanisms.
4. It provided for a separate international personality for the constituent members allowing them to act as sovereign states.
5. It did not provide for an effective implementation of the three freedoms (movement, settlement, property ownership), which are essential attributes of citizenship in any state.
6. It prescribed a predominantly confederal rather than a federal state.<sup>79</sup>

### **Enter Vassilliou**

Following the failure of the Draft Framework Agreement, a two year period of stagnation ensued, until 1988, when negotiations resumed under a new leadership on the Greek Cypriots part. George Vassilliou, a successful businessman with no important political base had entered the Greek Cypriot political scene in the 1980s and in February 1988, with a campaign pledging to solve the Cyprus problem, attained the presidency with an upset victory over Kyprianou.

<sup>78</sup> Mirbagheri, Farid, *Cyprus and International Peace Making*, C.Hurst & Co. London, 1998, pg. 136

<sup>79</sup> *ibid*, pg. 136-137

Negotiations resumed through UN-arranged meetings between Vassiliou and Denktas, however, the parties began at square one because the former, although accepted the agreements of 1977 and 1979, did not take the drafts of 1985-86 as a more substantive starting point. Three rounds of meetings took place between August 1988 and May 1989, from which the UN mediators Oscar Camillion and Gustave Feissel managed to materialize a draft agreement. However, the construction of a draft agreement by UN mediators caused the UN to attract criticism from the Turkish Cypriots on the bases that “it had overstepped its role of providing good offices and had become active mediators, i.e. formulators.”<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, the three rounds of talks were completed and led to the calling of a high-level meeting in New York.

The two parties met with Cuellar in early 1990, but the meetings did not proceed as the Secretary General had anticipated. His deteriorated optimism manifested itself as he reported that “the gap between the two sides remained wide and that he was not convinced there was an agreed-upon basis on which to proceed.”<sup>81</sup> Cuellar’s acknowledgement of the impasse was coupled with a reaction towards the Turkish Cypriot administration, blaming them for seeking greater recognition and status than the UN framework could provide.

Denktas’s insistence on being recognized as having a ‘sovereign status’ was deemed absolutely unacceptable by the Greek Cypriots, who argued that the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government was in no position to concede sovereignty to the ‘illegal’ Turkish Cypriot regime. In the mean time, Denktas also started speaking of the existence of two ‘peoples,’ rather than ‘communities,’ insinuating the right of self-determination and trying to open the door for an internationally recognized independent Turkish Cypriot state. In his words, “there is no single representative government in Cyprus and no homogeneous Cypriot nation, but two *sovereign peoples* identified on the basis of ethnic origin, language, cultural tradition and religion.”<sup>82</sup>

The collapse of the talks of 1990 seemed to signal a turning away of both parties from the UN process. Cuellar’s objection to TRNC’s search for recognition was not baseless, however the Greek Cypriots were also trying to gain ground in their own way during the same time. As mentioned earlier, the Greek Cypriot administration was recognized as the legitimate government of Cyprus, and they *continued* using this as a means to internationalize the

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<sup>80</sup> Fisher, Roland J., *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, Journal of Peace Research, 2001, Vol. 38, pg. 316.

<sup>81</sup> Country Studies US, [www.countrystudies.us/cyprus/62.htm](http://www.countrystudies.us/cyprus/62.htm)

<sup>82</sup> Hale, William, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2002, pg. 252

Cyprus issue and gain support for their position, hence putting pressure on Turkey and TRNC to win concessions.

### **A New Era in the Cyprus Conflict: the 1990s**

UN efforts for a solution in Cyprus continued throughout the 1990s, however the application of the Cypriot ‘government’ to the then European Community, now the European Union, for full membership in 1990 opened up a new phase in the Cyprus conflict. We shall firstly review the events in the early part of the decade and move on to examine the negotiations approaching the turn of the century, and see how the EU took on a catalyst role.

#### **1992: Set of Ideas**

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar was succeeded by Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992, who, as his predecessor, pressed on for a settlement of the dispute over Cyprus. The president of Turkey at the time was Turgut Özal and among his priorities was the pursuit of improving relations with western powers, one of which was the European Community. The Özal government was very much conscious of the Cyprus problem and how it acted as a hurdle for improved relations with the west. In the mean time, the prime ministry in Greece changed hands and Constantine Mitsotakis replaced the hard-liner Andreas Papandreou in April 1990.

With the leadership in both the motherlands exuding an air of leniency for a solution and especially with Turkey projecting a flexible stance under Özal, Boutros Ghali saw it fit to pursue inter-communal negotiations. The Secretary General developed Cuellar’s proposals formulated during 1988-1990 and produced a “Set of Ideas,” presented to the leaders of the two communities to be discussed during the proximity talks in June 1992.

The Set of Ideas was a highly detailed plan composed of 100 paragraphs and a map showing the proposed territorial changes. Parallel to the draft proposal of 1984, the Set of Ideas gave considerable equality to the Turkish Cypriots in the functioning of the government. The plan stipulated a division of powers between the federal government and the two federated states, which would be entrusted with powers safeguarding the political equality and cultural identity of each community.

From June to August, Boutros Ghali and his representatives shuttled between Denktaş and Vassiliou in New York, when ultimately the talks came to a deadlock over two of the

eight headings in the Set of Ideas, namely the issues of territorial division and displaced persons.<sup>83</sup>

In October, Denktaş and Vassiliou came together for direct talks, again under UN auspices, but to no avail. The aforementioned eight headings, constituted of displaced persons, constitutional aspects and territorial adjustments, overall objectives, guiding principles, security and guarantee, economic development and safeguards and territorial arrangements, were taken up in sequence. As a result, the Turkish Cypriot side affirmed that it was “in basic agreement with 91 out of the 100 paragraphs,” but refused to accept the map as a basis for reaching an agreement. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, accepted the Set of Ideas and the map as “a basis for reaching an overall framework agreement” *but* subjected to negotiation.<sup>84</sup>

Turkish Cypriots argue that the whole scheme of the talks was regarded by the Greek Cypriots as a matter for *discussion* rather than *negotiation* and that the latter’s aim was to look constructive but in effect to push the process to a deadlock by leaving everything achieved open to further negotiation. However, it was the Turkish Cypriot reservations, over the issue of property and territorial division, which ultimately caused them to be blamed by the Secretary General for the failure of the talks. In addition, the Turkish Cypriots “maintained that sovereignty in the new federal state proposed would be given by each state to the federal institutions, from which it could not be said to emanate. This was said to deny the principle of federation.”<sup>85</sup> However, the idea of two sovereign states that would remain sovereign in a federation carried the danger of secession according to the Greek Cypriots and ran contrary to the idea of a “single sovereignty” within a federation.

What seemed to be the irreconcilable approach of the two sides and their mutual distrust was conveyed by the Secretary General in his report to the UN Security Council in November 19, 1992- “it appears from the recent joint meetings that there is a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides. It is difficult to envisage any successful outcome to the talks for as long as this situation prevails.”<sup>86</sup> Hence, in the light of these critical incompatibilities, meetings were adjourned to March 1993, whereupon a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs) were proposed in order to achieve progress on the substantive issues creating deadlocks.

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<sup>83</sup> Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/24472, 21 August, 1992

<sup>84</sup> TRNC Prime Ministry Public Information Office

<http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/DOSYALAR/MAIN%20NEGOTIATIONS.htm>

<sup>85</sup> Dodd, Clement, *Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After*, The Eothen Press, 2003, pg. 7

<sup>86</sup> UN doc. S/24830, para. 62

### 1993-1995: Confidence Building Measures

The package of confidence building measures was designed to act as an intermediary step in the face of the lack of progress over the Set of Ideas. In this sense, it entailed a gradualist approach. The aim was to produce some areas of agreement which might ultimately give way to a general reconciliation. Of course, there were concerns over whether the CBMs were a step forward for a solution or *de facto* the scale-down model of a final arrangement. In addition, the CBMs carried a risk of delaying a final solution because any CBM had to be tested for its “workability” and assessed in practice, which could take up to eight to ten years according to some estimates.<sup>87</sup>

Nevertheless, considering the impasse between the two communities, the CBMs seemed to be a constructive step forward. Among the set of CBMs, which can be viewed in Appendix V, two proposals stood out as bearing major significance: One was the reopening of Nicosia International Airport with joint access to both communities and the other was the resettlement of the Greek Cypriots to the Turkish-held area of Varosha, which would become a special area for bi-communal contact and commerce, a kind of free-trade zone in which both sides could trade goods and services. These propositions were reviewed and discussed for about two years (1993-1995), however they ultimately failed to produce a positive outcome due to Greek and Turkish Cypriot rejections at different times. The mutual rejections depended mainly on the nature of the proposed amendments for the measures; an amendment favoring one party would cause the rejection of the other. For instance, in early 1994 with mediation efforts of UN representatives Joe Clark and Gustave Feissel, a document detailing the measures were accepted by the Greek Cypriots, but the process derailed when intervention by US diplomats resulted in amendments designed to meet Turkish Cypriot objections that were then rejected by the Greek Cypriots.<sup>88</sup> The talks thus broke down without finding a middle point, once again pushing the process of negotiation into a state of limbo.

A key development just a month prior to the introduction of CBMs in March 1993 was the election of Glafcos Clerides as president in the south, who was known for his hard-line attitude towards the Set of Ideas; he declared that “acceptance of the Set of Ideas would block Cyprus’s course towards Europe.”<sup>89</sup> Keep in mind that the government in the south had

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<sup>87</sup> Inter-Parliamentary Union’s “Report on the Visit to Cyprus,” January 1994, pg. 8, [www.ipu.org/cypr-e/missn94.htm](http://www.ipu.org/cypr-e/missn94.htm)

<sup>88</sup> Fisher, Roland J., *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, Journal of Peace Research, 2001, Vol. 38, pg. 317.

<sup>89</sup> Dodd, Clement, *Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After*, The Eothen Press, 2003, pg. 7

applied to the EC for full membership in 1990, and we shall observe in the following section how “Cyprus’s course towards Europe,” i.e. the progress of Cyprus-EC/EU liaison, affected the mediation and negotiation processes.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE EU CATALYST AT WORK

The relations of the ‘Republic of Cyprus,’ i.e. South Cypriot administration, with the European Economic Community, and subsequently with the European Union, have evolved gradually from an Association Agreement in 1972 to a Customs Union Protocol in 1987, followed by the aforementioned application for full membership on July 4, 1990. The European Union, as it became in 1991, could be labeled as a ‘neutral third party’ *until* 1993, when following the positive *Opinion* of the European Commission, the Council declared Cyprus eligible for EU membership.<sup>90</sup> The Commission *Opinion*, dated June 30, 1993, acknowledged the de-facto Turkish Cypriot government in the north but did not see this as a reason to put any reservation on the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot application on behalf of the whole island. Furthermore, the prospect of Cyprus’ accession to the Community was seen as a factor that would facilitate and hasten the process of a peaceful settlement, as expressed in the Commission *Opinion*:

Cyprus’ integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and a lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict- a settlement that will make it possible for the two communities to be reconciled, for confidence to be re-established and for their respective leaders to work together.”<sup>91</sup>

These initial steps bringing Cyprus closer to EU membership were followed by the latter’s increased show of inclination to accept the former into the union despite the fact that a settlement could not be seen in the near future. During the Corfu Summit in June 1994, held under the Greek Presidency, the Council confirmed the Greek Cypriot application for accession by stating that an essential stage in Cyprus’ preparations for accession could be regarded as completed.”<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, it was decided that “the next phase of enlargement of the Union will include Cyprus and Malta.”<sup>93</sup> The Council reiterated these views in the Essen Summit the same year in December.

A plea was made in Corfu for a settlement of the Cyprus problem that would “respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the country, in accordance

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<sup>90</sup> One of the main functions of the European Commission is its role as an advisory body. The ‘Opinions’ issued by the Commission are highly influential but not binding on the decisions of the European Council.

<sup>91</sup> EU Commission *Opinion* on the Republic of Cyprus, 1993, para. 47

<sup>92</sup> European Council at Corfu, June 1994, Presidency Conclusions, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Section B, para. 1

<sup>93</sup> *ibid*, para 3



with the relevant UN resolutions and high-level agreements,”<sup>94</sup> but as we shall see below, this turned out to be more of an aspiration than a condition.

Another blow by the EU to the Turkish Cypriot side came one month following the Corfu Summit, this time by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). An initiative stemming from the Greek Cypriots led to the ECJ ruling against TRNC exports. TRNC exports thus became subjugated to Greek Cypriot authority in that without the health and transport certificates given by the latter, TRNC exports to the EU would be prohibited; this of course pushed TRNC into further economic isolation.

### **1995- ‘The Trade-Off’**

The EU decisions over Cyprus in 1995 marked a turning point because the Council dropped the condition that the division of the island be ended before accession negotiations could begin. On March 6, the General Affairs Council of Foreign Ministers confirmed Cyprus’ suitability for membership, but more importantly, stated that accession negotiations would be initiated within six months following the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).<sup>95</sup>

It was also stated that “Cyprus” accession should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation.”<sup>96</sup> Notice that the wording uses “Cyprus” instead of “Republic of Cyprus,” suggesting, and more-so hoping, that a united, federal state of Cyprus might replace the divided Cyprus in the future. As accounted by Brewin, the French Presidency had threatened to substitute the words ‘Federation of Cyprus’ which would have restored the precondition of a prior settlement, but instead the communiqué contented itself with hoping for a settlement, and instructed the Commission to inform the Turkish Cypriots, and for that matter the Turkish government, about the advantages of EU membership.<sup>97</sup> Nevertheless, as we shall see below, the EU did not follow up the use of “Cyprus” but instead initiated accession negotiations with the “Republic of Cyprus.”

The Turkish government under Tansu Çiller played a leading role in the outcome of the EU decisions over Cyprus in 1995. The previous year, the Greek government had vetoed Turkey’s request for joining the Customs Union of EU, which was expected to bring paramount economic advantages to the country. Although both Greece and Turkey publicly denounce any such deal, Greece lifted its veto over Turkey and the latter turned a deaf ear

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<sup>94</sup> *ibid*, para. 4

<sup>95</sup> Conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers, 6 March, 1995

<sup>96</sup> *ibid*

<sup>97</sup> Brewin, Christopher, The European Union and Cyprus, The Eothen Press, 2000, pg. 17

while the EU went ahead and gave a date to Cyprus for accession negotiations *without* any preconditions.

This ‘trade-off’ brought harsh criticism to the Çiller government by the political opposition in Turkey and infuriated the Turkish Cypriots, rightfully interpreting the situation as being ‘sold-out’ by the motherland. The Turkish government naturally denied any link between its newly won membership to the Customs Union and the EU decision over Cyprus, and attributed the latter development solely to the European Union. A joint Turkish-TRNC reaction came in the form of a declaration, indicating an intention of partial integration, which did not materialize until 1997, a time when EU-Turkish relations deteriorated to a near-extreme, as we shall see in the next section.

### **Continued UN initiatives in the Face of the EU Catalyst**

From 1995 on-wards, the European Commission and the Government in South Cyprus collaborated successfully in preparing the latter for integration into the EU.<sup>98</sup> The success of Greek Cypriot-EU convergence however caused a further divergence of the two communities in Cyprus. With the Turkish Cypriots evermore alienated and drifting closer to Turkey as their only advocate, there was an urgent need for a settlement. The UN Security Council thus developed initiatives in 1996 and 1997 which resulted in the negotiations in Troutbeck (New York) and Glion (Switzerland) on July and August of 1997, respectively.

Before moving on to the analysis of UN efforts and ‘the EU effect’ in the second half of the 1990s, we should briefly review two turbulent incidents that further strained the relationship between Turkey, Greece and the two Cypriot communities. The first was the Kardak/Imia Crisis, which brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war in January 1996. The rocky, uninhabited outcrop of Kardak/Imia<sup>99</sup> in the Aegean Sea became the ground of the ‘battle of the flags’<sup>100</sup> when the mayor of Kalymnos planted a Greek flag on the islet which was only to be replaced by a group of Turkish journalists, thus escalating the tension between the two countries and furthermore bringing their navies face-to-face. A direct armed clash was fortunately avoided, but of course this incident did not help the deteriorated Turkish-Greek relations.

A second crisis occurred when the Clerides government announced that it had ordered S-300 air defense missiles from Russia, which was naturally interpreted as a threat by the

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<sup>98</sup> ‘Preparation’ means harmonizing, adapting Cyprus’ law, institutions etc., bringing them to EU standards.

<sup>99</sup> Kardak/Imia is about 7,5 km off the coast of Turkey and less than 9 km from the Greek Island of Kalymnos

<sup>100</sup> Hale, William, Turkish Foreign Policy, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2002, pg. 255.

Turks; Çiller, who had become the foreign minister, reciprocated by threatening to destroy the missiles.<sup>101</sup> Turkish-Greek relations somewhat normalized with the new coalition government in Turkey headed by Mesut Yılmaz and renewed talks between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities began shortly after.

### **Troutbeck and Glion Direct Talks**

As mentioned above, it became apparent in the mid-1990s that the Greek Cypriot government was on the fast track moving towards EU membership; it had also become evident that their membership would be on behalf of the whole island. Nevertheless, the de facto division in Cyprus was still a reality and needed prompt resolution prior to the approaching EU membership. Thus, with particularly US and UK support, the UN, under the new Secretary General Kofi Annan, arranged for a series of negotiations between Clerides and Denktaş.

The negotiations in Troutbeck and Glion, which were mediated by UN Representative Diego Cordovez, revolved around a revised version of the Set of Ideas for a comprehensive settlement. However, this period in the history of the negotiations in Cyprus is more-so associated with the EU effects on the negotiations rather than the negotiations themselves.

In the face of the protracted nature of the Cyprus conflict and countless failed attempts of negotiation and mediation efforts, the entrance of the ‘EU factor’ added only fuel to the intractability of the conflict, though it should be stressed that the controversy of EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict does not revolve around the question of *why* it intervened but *how* it intervened.

Almost simultaneously with the Troutbeck talks, the Commission issued ‘Agenda 2000,’ a set of proposals concerning the future development of the EU, which recommended the initiation of accession negotiations with the “Republic of Cyprus” regardless of whether there was any progress in negotiations or not.<sup>102</sup> Hence it became clear that the Greek Cypriot government would be admitted into the union, representing the whole island, without the prerequisite of a settlement.

The aforementioned formula in which ‘TRNC drew closer to motherland Turkey as Greek Cypriot-EU relations solidified’ was verified following the events of 1997. Of course, drawing closer to the motherland means moving away from the possibility of reconciliation

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<sup>101</sup> It was in December 1998 that the Clerides government announced the missiles would no be deployed in Cyprus.

<sup>102</sup> *Agenda 2000*, Commission Communication, Doc. 97/6, 15 July 1997, vol. 1, *For a Stronger and Wider Union*, par. 66

and thus the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the UN sponsored negotiations, demanding recognition of TRNC and suspension of EU accession talks with the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots refused to participate in a federal scheme that did not recognize their existence as a state. They claimed that they were being undermined as a community and their rights were not being respected in the proposed structure of the state; the Turkish Cypriots would not be numerically equal in central institutions, being given instead ‘effective participation,’ but no veto powers to make participation truly effective.<sup>103</sup>

Paralleling these flow of events, Turkey and TRNC started exuding serious signals of integration; following a Declaration of Solidarity in January 1997 and a Joint Statement in July, the two governments signed an association agreement in August, foreseeing cooperation in economics, finance, security, defense and foreign affaires. Furthermore, it was stated that “...every structural cooperation and harmonization measure to be initiated between the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus and the EU will be similarly implemented between the TRNC and Turkey.”<sup>104</sup> Overall, Turkey and TRNC stressed that the negotiation process should be based on the political and sovereign equality of the two sides in Cyprus, and that the Greece-Turkish balance established by the 1960 international treaties should be safeguarded. Further, it was pointed out that the EU would be responsible for any negative development arising from the commencement of the accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration unless it acknowledged the political realities on the island.<sup>105</sup>

Another blow to TRNC and Turkey came when on December 1997 during the Luxembourg Summit the European Council announced its decision to initiate a comprehensive enlargement process with ten applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe,<sup>106</sup> foreseeing initiation of accession negotiations with Cyprus in 1998 and rejecting Turkey’s application of candidacy for EU membership on the grounds that “the political and economic conditions allowing accession negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied.”<sup>107</sup> The EU *once again* expressed the idea that accession of Cyprus would reflect positively to the Cyprus dispute:

The accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation. The accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem through the talks under the aegis

<sup>103</sup> Dodd, Clement, *Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After*, The Eothen Press, 2003, pg. 10

<sup>104</sup> Turkey-TRNC Joint Statement, 20 July, 1997

<sup>105</sup> TRNC Prime Ministry Public Information Office

<http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/DOSYALAR/MAIN%20NEGOTIATIONS.htm>

<sup>106</sup> Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia

<sup>107</sup> Conclusions of the European Council on Turkey, [www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey)

of the United Nations that must continue with a view to creating a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation.<sup>108</sup>

As a result, Turkey immediately suspended political dialogue with the EU and *once again* protested by expressing its intentions of integration with TRNC, which can be deemed as a threat implying annexation.

### **Legality of Cypriot Application and Accession to the EU**

The Greek Cypriot application to the EU (then EC) carried with it tremendous potential of political advantages for the Greek side. Thus, as opposed to most applicant countries wherein the reason of application is economically based, the Greek Cypriot application was more-so a political move. As summarized by Tocci, EU membership would substantiate Greek Cypriot claim to be the only legitimate government on the island; it would favor a settlement which would liberalize the three freedoms that they seek (given that these wholly overlap with the four freedoms of the *acquis communautaire*); and it would increase their security, reducing their perception of threat from Turkey.<sup>109</sup>

The Greek Cypriots thus had very good reasons and substantive expectations from their accession to the EU, but was the positive reciprocation of the latter legal, and for that matter legitimate?

Mendelson, in his famous published legal opinion regarding the application of the “Republic of Cyprus” to join the EU, which was circulated at the UN by the Turkish government, concluded that the Greek Cypriot administration is not entitled in international law to apply to join or, having applied, to join, the European Union whilst Turkey is not a member. Furthermore, as members of the EU and parties to the agreements in question, Greece and the United Kingdom are under an obligation to seek to prevent such accession. Moreover, as a matter of the law of the European Community, there are serious legal obstacles to such accession.<sup>110</sup>

The legality and legitimacy of Greek Cypriot application and accession to the EU is being challenged by the Turkish side by reference to international treaties and agreements which gave birth to the 1960 constitution on which the Greek Cypriots base their legitimacy today.<sup>111</sup> Turkey also refers to several Security Council resolutions stating that “a settlement

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<sup>108</sup> European Commission’s Representation in Cyprus, [www.delcyp.cec.eu.int/en/eu\\_and\\_cyprus/cy\\_acc.htm](http://www.delcyp.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_cyprus/cy_acc.htm)

<sup>109</sup> Tocci, Natalie, Proceedings of a Panel discussion entitled “Why Cyprus Entry into the European Union would be Illegal,” Published by the Turkish Embassy in London, November 2001, pg. 22

<sup>110</sup> Mendelson, Maurice H., Why Cyprus Entry into the European Union would be Illegal, Published by the Turkish Embassy in London, October 2001, pg 33.

<sup>111</sup> Treaty provisions and basic documents with regard to the EU membership of Cyprus can be found at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession,”<sup>112</sup> to object to the Greek Cypriot *union* with the EU, and hence in a sense *union* with Greece, since they are already a member.

In respect of the Treaty of Guarantee, which Mendelson draws particular attention to, the first two articles are taken as a reference point, stating that the Republic of Cyprus “undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever” and that “they [Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey] likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.”<sup>113</sup>

A second legal objection to Greek Cypriot application and admittance to the EU without Turkey’s consent comes through reference to Article 50 of the 1960 constitution. The article states that “the President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate, or concerning defense and security...”<sup>114</sup> The objection that is raised due to this clause is that Cypriot membership to an international association of which *either* Greece *or* Turkey is not a member would be invalid. Furthermore, it is argued that since after the events of the early 1960s the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President was driven from office, the Turkish Cypriot veto right has been taken away, which overall “constitutes a breach of treaty obligations, not to mention its purely domestic obligations,” due to the latter part of the argument.<sup>115</sup>

Of course, there are various legal arguments, dealing with a variety of articles and provisions of international treaties and agreements, countering the Greek Cypriot application and admittance to the EU, but the scope of this thesis allows only the basic legal arguments to be put forward. Hence, lastly I shall refer to Article 170 of the constitution, stating that “the Republic shall, by agreement on appropriate terms, accord most-favored-nation treatment to the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for all agreements whatever their nature might be.”<sup>116</sup> The intention of this clause was to exclude more favorable bilateral agreements between Cyprus and countries other than the three guarantor powers and also to avoid the possibility of either Greece or

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<sup>112</sup> UN Security Council Resolutions 649, 716, 750, 774, 939

<sup>113</sup> Articles 1 and 2, Treaty of Guarantee, 1960

<sup>114</sup> Article 50.1 (a), Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, 1960

<sup>115</sup> Mendelson, Maurice H., Why Cyprus Entry into the European Union would be Illegal, Published by the Turkish Embassy in London, October 2001, pg 72

<sup>116</sup> Article 170, Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, 1960

Turkey securing a more favorable position in Cyprus than the other- of Greece for example establishing a kind of “economic enosis.” Thus the entry of Cyprus to the EU would “double violate” the spirit of this provision according to the Turkish case.<sup>117</sup>

These allegations by the Turkish side are not unanswered by the Greeks.<sup>118</sup> Parallel to the aforementioned legal objections, the Greeks claim that the Treaty of Guarantee does not prohibit Cyprus from becoming a member of a regional organization such as the European Union and that membership would not constitute participation “in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever” within the meaning of Article 1.<sup>119</sup>

As to Article 50, it is claimed that there is no person now filling the role of Vice-President, and that the provisions dealing with the powers of the Vice President are in abeyance. Thus the Vice-Presidential veto provided for in Article 50 cannot be exercised. In any event, the accession of Cyprus would not involve, in present circumstances, a “manifest” breach of internal law within the meaning of Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and thus it could not subsequently be invoked by Cyprus as a basis for invalidating its consent to be bound by the EU treaties.<sup>120</sup>

We had stated that Article 170 provided for most-favored nation treatment to be extended by Cyprus to the three guarantor states “for all agreements whatever their nature may be.” Such treatment has only to be extended “by agreement on appropriate terms.” In common with other most-favored-nation clauses, the Greek side claims that Article 170 does not prohibit Cyprus from entering into agreements which confer benefits on third states; it envisages that benefits extended to the most-favored-nation will also be extended to each of the guarantors. Thus Article 170 does not prohibit Cyprus from acceding to any agreement whatever. In fact, EC membership is not regarded as triggering general mfn obligations, under the GATT or otherwise. Furthermore, it is stated that both Turkey and Greece, in bilateral treaties concluded with Cyprus after independence, recognized that mfn obligations in respect of trade in products do not apply “to privileges...preferences or concessions...granted...in the future to other countries on account of...participation, entry or association...[to] a customs union, a free trade area or an economic community.” For these reasons Article 170 would not require Cyprus to extend any additional benefits of EU membership to Turkey.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Mendelson, Maurice H., Why Cyprus Entry into the European Union would be Illegal, Published by the Turkish Embassy in London, October 2001, pg 71

<sup>118</sup> For a concise legal opinion of the Greek Cypriot position, refer to opinions of James Crawford, Gerhard Hafner and Alain Pellet (Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Publications, [www.moi.gov.cy](http://www.moi.gov.cy))

<sup>119</sup> Hellenic Resource Network, [www.hri.org/forum/intpol/cyprus-eu.html](http://www.hri.org/forum/intpol/cyprus-eu.html)

<sup>120</sup> *ibid*

<sup>121</sup> *ibid*

## The EU Strategy; Defining EU's Role in the Conflict

While the Turkish and Greek sides exhausted every possible argument defending their positions, it was the EU that ultimately took the decision of including Cyprus into its enlargement project. Put aside the legal dimensions of the Cyprus-EU relations, there is an outweighing political dimension to the issue.

The Central and Eastern European enlargement project was one of the most important, if not the most important, issue on the EU agenda in the 1990s. Given the unanimity voting system in the EU, Greece had a veto power over the highly valued enlargement project. What has been labeled as the "Greek blackmail" was thus a critical factor pulling the EU and making it a party to the Cyprus conflict. Nevertheless, the EU rhetoric conveys, as we have seen in its aforementioned *opinions* and decisions, that its involvement constitutes a pretext for resolution but does not mean that it is party to the conflict.

This justification is based on the so-called 'Community method' of dispute settlement. As exemplified by a settlement of dispute in the 1920s between Germany and Poland,<sup>122</sup> it is contended that the importance of political frontiers will cease to exist along with the realization of economic integration and its benefits. In the case of Cyprus however, since the two communities are far from any kind of integration, it is only hoped that a political solution will be promoted with the *prospect* of gaining economic advantages. Of course, since it was the Turkish Cypriots who were isolated from the EU accession process and ultimately membership, the benefits emanating from EU membership was intended to entice the Turkish Cypriots, not the Greek Cypriots who have already become members.

This approach of the EU, which is also referred to as the stick-carrot policy, brought upon an obvious leverage in favor of the Greek Cypriot side, such that, having guaranteed EU membership they would be less willing to give concessions during inter-communal negotiations. There were some European officials and member state representatives, who, in contrast to this policy, contended that if pressure was put on the Greek Cypriots, over whom the EU had some degree of leverage due to the accession negotiations, better results might be yielded in the negotiations over Cyprus.<sup>123</sup> It was maintained that pressure on the Greek Cypriots by using technical issues of accession negotiations about the implementation of the *acquis* would instigate a softer policy of the Greek Cypriot government *vis-à-vis* TRNC and Turkey. As an example, lifting the trade ban on Turkish goods by the Cypriot government was

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<sup>122</sup> The dispute concerned the claim of Poles and Germans over a coalfield and was resolved by a treaty allowing both communities to use the area, hence in a sense dissolving the boarder.

<sup>123</sup> Diez, Tomas, *Last Exit to Paradise? The EU, the Cyprus Conflict, and the Problematic 'Catalyst Effect,'* Copenhagen Research Institute, June 2000, pg. 6



cited, which was obviously not in line with the customs union between EU and Turkey. The anticipated result would be a “subversion catalyst,” a term coined by Diez, in which the negotiations would “provide some stimulus for the government of Cyprus to make moves that encourage links between the two halves.”<sup>124</sup>

It turned out however that the EU leverage over Greek Cypriots did not outweigh Greece’s leverage over the EU itself, and thus, ultimately a policy favoring Greek Cypriots was adopted. Inter-communal talks were proceeding simultaneously with the accession negotiations, and we shall observe in the next section the little progress achieved at the approach of the new millennium through negotiation and mediation efforts coupled with the EU catalyst.

### **The New Millennium**

As we have seen above, the inter-communal talks in Troutbeck and Glion were overshadowed by the controversial EU decisions over Cyprus. The situation became further clouded when Denktas demanded the talks to proceed “on the basis of real equality from state to state,”<sup>125</sup> which specifically meant recognition of TRNC sovereignty. This move was above all a reaction to the intensifying EU-Greek Cypriot relations and aimed at bringing an edge to the Turkish Cypriot position by establishing a sense of “negotiation between equals” so to speak. This of course was unacceptable to the Greeks who stressed the illegality and illegitimacy of TRNC at every chance.

The problematic issue of sovereignty has always been lurking around the Cyprus dispute and continues to be one of the core issues of divergence between the two Cypriot communities. Paralleling TRNC’s aspirations to be recognized as a sovereign equal, Denktas produced a confederation proposal in August 1998,<sup>126</sup> which was not the first time the idea was pronounced, as you shall remember from the above sections. A confederal system, which is a looser form of union than a federal system, would give a higher degree of autonomy to the constituents and hence was not a well-received proposition by the Greek Cypriots who perceive the idea of higher autonomy as a higher risk for Turkish Cypriot session (partition).

A period of stagnation had ensued following the demise of the Troutbeck and Glion talks and the aforementioned proposition failed to produce any advances when the Greek Cypriots rejected it without consideration. The expected budge came in late 1999, when UN

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<sup>124</sup> *ibid*

<sup>125</sup> Denktas, Rauf R., *The Crux of the Cyprus Problem*, Perceptions, Vol. IV, No. 3 Sept.-Nov. 1999, pg. 22

<sup>126</sup> See Confederation Proposal in Appendix VI

Secretary General Kofi Annan convinced Denktas and Clerides to meet, given that the talks would be held between ‘two equal parties without any preconditions’ and that they could bring to the table any issue they deemed as a ‘core issue.’ The prohibition of preconditions meant that the Turkish Cypriots could not demand a prior recognition of sovereignty but this was appeased, so to speak, by the phrase ‘two equal parties.’

The period following the initiation of proximity talks in late 1999 was typical in that it followed in the tradition of Turkish-Greek Cypriot talks where a series of meetings are called and adjourned and a whole lot of talking is done but ultimately no substantive results are achieved. This typical picture however did not fit into the bigger picture where the conjuncture created by the ‘EU catalyst,’ which will be elaborated below, required an evermore urgent resolution of the Cyprus issue, and it was in this spirit that the Annan Plan was born.

### **Proximity talks and the Birth of the Annan Plan**

The first round of proximity talks was initiated in New York between Denktas and Clerides through the dates 3-14 December, 1999. In the mean time, the European Council of Helsinki (December 1999) declared the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. Following the preceding rebuff by the 1997 Luxemburg Council, which had strained EU-Turkey relations to a near-extreme, the EU decision to grant Turkey candidacy in Helsinki restored the relations of the two. Of course, conferring Turkish candidacy did not come without reference to the Cyprus issue; the Council expressed that Turkey was expected to solve all ‘border disputes,’ implying the situation in Cyprus and the Turkish-Greek disagreement over the Aegean Sea.<sup>127</sup> Furthermore, the Council concluded that if no settlement was reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession would be made without a precondition of a political settlement.<sup>128</sup>

Although the Helsinki Council declared that whilst a settlement is reached the accession of Cyprus to the EU would be facilitated,<sup>129</sup> the absence of preconditions, as mentioned earlier, dissolved any concrete link between the Cyprus problem and the accession of the ‘Republic of Cyprus.’ Overall, though the granting of candidacy by the EU was received with delight by Turkey, it also highlighted the pressure exerted on Turkey for a settlement in Cyprus.

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<sup>127</sup> Conclusions of the Presidency, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, par. 4

<sup>128</sup> *ibid*, par. 9b

<sup>129</sup> *ibid*, par. 9b

As noted above, proximity talks between the two Cypriot leaders began in late 1999. The first three rounds were uneventful and unprogressive due to the general intransigence of the two sides that we have witnessed before and also due to Clerides' ill-health, which prevented the completion of the third round (May, 2000). By this time, Alvaro De Soto, Secretary General's Special Advisor for Cyprus, had acknowledged the difficulty in bringing the sides to a common ground and noted that he doubted a solution could be found by the end of the year.<sup>130</sup>

On September 2000, on the occasion of the initiation of the fourth round, Annan, seeing the persisting deadlock, spoke of a "new partnership", "the equal status of the two parties" and that "each represents its side and no one else." Furthermore, the Secretary General put forward the idea that each side be treated as "the political equal of the other," to reach "a comprehensive settlement enshrining a new partnership."<sup>131</sup> The Greek Cypriots objected to the use of such terminology and boycotted the talks claiming that the term "political equality" insinuated recognition of TRNC.

Despite this setback the talks dragged on, though without Greek Cypriot acknowledgement of "political equality." The Secretary General's next move was the introduction of Oral Proposals on November 2000, where once again a federal structure was foreseen, at least in name. The proposal, which was broadly in accord with those advanced by the Greek Cypriots in 1989, was a step backward from the constitutional proposals in the 1992 Set of Ideas for the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>132</sup> In the latter's view, the proposal fundamentally departed from the concept of "a new partnership" and "equal status." Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots criticized the proposal for characterizing a unitary structure with its emphasize on "one sovereign, indissoluble common state" with a "single international legal personality" and a "common government" with a "basic law." Other deficiencies, in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriots, was the usage of the term "community" for the two peoples and the statement that the "provision of the comprehensive settlement should not represent an obstacle to such membership," in reference to EU membership. Furthermore, issues of territorial adjustments and guarantees were not found satisfying. The overall outlook was that

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<sup>130</sup> TRNC Prime Ministry Public Information Office  
<http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/DOSYALAR/MAIN%20NEGOTIATIONS.htm>

<sup>131</sup> *ibid*

<sup>132</sup> Dodd, Clement, *Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After*, The Eothen Press, 2003, pg. 14

the Oral Proposals in its entirety was tailored to meet the demands of the Greek Cypriot party and disregarded the most vital needs and interests of the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>133</sup>

These failed UN initiatives coincided with the November 2000 Accession Partnership Document drawn up by the Commission, which stated that Turkey should strongly support in the context of political dialogue the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring the process of finding a settlement for the Cyprus problem to a successful conclusion.<sup>134</sup> Thus, the EU stance over the Cyprus problem, which can also be assessed from its earlier decisions, clearly put more burden on TRNC and Turkey's shoulders than the 'Republic of Cyprus' itself.

Another slap to Turkey came when on May 2001 the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Turkey in a judgment declaiming its occupation of northern Cyprus, particularly denial of rights to Greek Cypriots who were dispossessed by the 1974 invasion or the few who still live in the north. The court also cited Turkey for violating Turkish Cypriots' rights to a free and fair trial.<sup>135</sup> The Greek Cypriots have increasingly used the legal mechanisms of Europe to build leverage against the Turkish state<sup>136</sup> which increased the urgency, on Turkey's part, for a solution in Cyprus.

The back-to-back failed UN mediation and negotiation attempts generated a grim picture of the Cyprus problem, nevertheless, "external and internal pressures stemming partly from Turkish economic difficulties,<sup>137</sup> and their impact on Northern Cyprus, created an atmosphere in which further attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict seemed necessary."<sup>138</sup> External pressure was exerted mainly by the EU flank, through its aforementioned decisions and rulings over Turkey and TRNC. Internal pressure, on the other hand, came in the form of increased support for left-wing pro-EU parties in TRNC and a relative loss of faith in hardliners such as Denktaş himself. In the case of Turkey, the positive public opinion about prospects of Turkey's EU membership was being sustained but the coalition government headed by Bülent Ecevit, whose stance on the Cyprus issue was similar to that of Denktaş, was steadily losing support. This was confirmed in the November 2002 general elections when the "neo-Islamic" Justice and Development Party (AKP) won an overwhelming victory

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<sup>133</sup> TRNC Prime Ministry Public Information Office

<http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/DOSYALAR/MAIN%20NEGOTIATIONS.htm>

<sup>134</sup> Accession Partnership Document for Turkey, Political Dialog and Political Criteria, November 8, 2000

<sup>135</sup> Court judgment in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey is accessible on ECHR official website, [www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2001/May/Cyprusv.Turkeyjudepress.htm](http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2001/May/Cyprusv.Turkeyjudepress.htm)

<sup>136</sup> Kyle, Keith, "The Main Narrative," [www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm](http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm)

<sup>137</sup> Turkey was, at the time, still trying to recuperate from the devaluation of 1999 and the resulting general economic degradation.

<sup>138</sup> Dodd, Clement, *Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After*, The Eothen Press, 2003, pg. 14

by gaining %34 of the votes, leaving the former coalition government parties out of the parliament.

Returning to my initial point, despite the consistent failure of international mediation and negotiations, internal and external pressure to solve the Cyprus conflict had mounted and consequently Denktaş offered a personal invitation to Clerides to enter face-to-face talks in November 2001. This personal initiative launched by Denktaş and the positive reciprocation of Clerides created high expectations for a long overdue political settlement on Cyprus.

The UN got into the picture with its envoy De Soto who stated that he would only observe, as if a “fly on the wall,”<sup>139</sup> and simply take notes while the two leaders met. This, however, turned out to be far from the truth as De Soto’s frequent interventions became apparent. During the talks, the Turkish Cypriot side once again demonstrated its partiality to confederal principles by proposing a form of a ‘partnership state,’ comprising two sovereign states, and as before, the Greek Cypriots rejected any such scheme. De Soto’s interventions, which were probably due to a lack of progress, did not suffice and before long the talks came to an end.

In the mean time, the EU reiterated its stance towards the Cyprus problem in the Seville Council in June 2002, stating that “the European Union’s *preference* [not requirement] continues to be for the accession of a reunited island” and that “the EU would make a substantial financial contribution in support of the development of the northern part of a reunited island.”<sup>140</sup> The former part of the statement is the classical EU rhetoric which omits the conditionality of a solution prior to accession; the latter part has to do with the aforementioned “EU method” of promoting political solutions with the prospect of economic gains, which is referred to as common bribery by hardliners on the Turkish side.

The face-to-face talks, failing to generate even a glimmer of progress, combined with the pressing situation of the approaching accession of Cyprus, led to the production of a comprehensive plan for a final effort to reach a settlement in Cyprus prior to the materialization of its EU membership; this was the Annan Plan.

### **Scrutinizing the Annan Plan**

Named after UN Secretary General, the design and birth of the Annan Plan owes to contributions by the USA and EU, specifically the UK, with its former Special Representative to Cyprus, Lord David Hannay. The plan was submitted in 11 November 2002, just a month

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<sup>139</sup> Christou, Jean, [www.cypriot.org.uk/Haber/Commitment-to-urgent.htm](http://www.cypriot.org.uk/Haber/Commitment-to-urgent.htm)

<sup>140</sup> Conclusions of the Presidency, Seville European Council, 21-22 June 2002, par. 24

before the landmark date of December 12, 2002 in Copenhagen, which marked the signing of the accession protocol of 10 new countries<sup>141</sup> that were to fully *-de jure-* join the EU in May 1 2004. Reaching an agreement over the plan within a month would have been an overly optimistic expectation, hence the true goal was for a solution prior to Cyprus' accession to the EU.<sup>142</sup> As expressed in the Copenhagen Council, the EU urged the leaders of the two Cypriot communities "to seize this opportunity" so that a united Cyprus could join the Union.<sup>143</sup> In the absence of a settlement by the time of accession, the European Council decided that "the application of the *acquis* to the northern part of the island shall be suspended, until the Council decides unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission, in consultation with the government of Cyprus, to consider ways of promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer to the Union."<sup>144</sup>

The Annan Plan was a comprehensive document addressing all the major issues and providing a blueprint for a functioning government; the aim was to leave no political matter unaddressed and to avoid any legal vacuums at any phase of the settlement in Cyprus. As in the 1992 UN 'Set of Ideas' proposal, the plan embraced the idea of a bi-zonal, bi-communal island with a single international personality.

The framework of the plan bore resemblance to the Belgian model, which establishes a balanced institutional structure between the two constituent communities, the Flemish and the Walloon. The plan also incorporated features of the Swiss model and overall established a system which is often described as a hybrid between a federation and a confederation.

As in the case of the two Belgian communities, political equality of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots is a prerequisite for the Belgian model to work in Cyprus. As allowed under Article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty, each sub-national government in Belgium represents its own case in the councils of the EU, though presenting it for the country *as a whole*. Of course, the applicability of such a complex scheme, requiring a great deal of cooperation, to the Cyprus case is a controversial issue.<sup>145</sup> Nevertheless, if a "new partnership" or new "state of affairs"<sup>146</sup> was to be established in which the two Cypriot communities were to possess single citizenship under one flag and have single international representation, a good degree of cooperation between the communities had to be presupposed.

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<sup>141</sup> The ten countries were Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

<sup>142</sup> Cyprus signed the EU Accession Treaty on April 16, 2003 and became an official (de jure) member on May 1, 2004

<sup>143</sup> Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002, par. 10

<sup>144</sup> *ibid* par. 12

<sup>145</sup> Dodd, Clement, *Disaccord on Cyprus; The UN Plan and After*, The Eothen Press, 2003, pg. 16

<sup>146</sup> The Annan Plan, Main Articles, 1- 3

A thorough analysis of the Annan plan is a task in itself, thus a succinct overview of its main features is expected to suffice for the purposes of this thesis. As mentioned above, the plan was first presented on 11 November 2002. Revisions were subsequently issued on 10 December 2002, 26 February 2003 and 29 March 2004. The Secretary-General presented the final version of the plan to the parties on 31 March 2004, in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. On April 18 Corrigenda and clarifications were issued and incorporated in the 31 March text, the corrected version of which was authenticated by De Soto and submitted to the parties on 23 April 2004.

The five times revised plan is constituted of a Foundation Agreement, which consists of the Main Articles and 9 Annexes, dealing with constitutional and federal laws of the “United Cyprus Republic,” as well as issues such as territorial adjustments and property regime, which was to govern all properties from which people were displaced because of the events between December 1963 to the present.<sup>147</sup>

The wording and semantics of a document which is expected to be approved by sides which have exuded an intense sense of distrust and rivalry for decades is bound to be taken up very carefully. Since the Annan Plan was designed to bring a settlement to the Cyprus issue, with its endless problems over sovereignty, territory, property and what-not, the whole document can be said to be a huge exercise in semantics. Starting with the ever-problematic issue of sovereignty, the plan called for “the separately expressed common will,”<sup>148</sup> trying to please both the Greek Cypriots, by insinuating that there is just one Cypriot people (with the phrase “common will”), and also implied a sense of two “separate” sovereignties, which appeased the Turkish Cypriots.

In this light, the plan provided for a “common state” (the federal state) and two “constituent states” (the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State), which, as in the Belgian model, did not have a hierarchical relationship but were of equal status. The common state was bequeathed with functions very similar to the federal government functions of the 1992 Set of Ideas’ proposals.<sup>149</sup> The functions were outlined as follows: external relations, including conclusion of international treaties and defense policy; relations with the European Union; central Bank functions, including issuance of currency, monetary policy and banking regulations; federal finances, including budget and all indirect taxation (including customs and excise), and federal economic and trade policy; natural resources, including water

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<sup>147</sup> Refer to Appendix VII for an overview of the Main Articles, which contain the principle elements of the plan, and the headlines of the Annexes and Appendixes.

<sup>148</sup> The Annan Plan, Appendix A, Foundation Agreement, par. 10

<sup>149</sup> Dodd, Clement, *Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After*, The Eothen Press, 2003, pg. 18

resources and if found, oil; meteorology, aviation, international navigation and the continental shelf and territorial waters; communications (including postal, electronic and telecommunications); Cypriot citizenship (including issuance of passports) and immigration (including asylum, deportation and extradition of aliens); combating terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime; pardons and amnesties (other than for crimes concerning only one constituent state); intellectual property and weights and measures; and antiquities

The constituent states, on the other hand, were bestowed with residual powers over which they could “sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the federal government.”<sup>150</sup> These were matters concerning tourism, fisheries, agriculture, industry, commerce, planning, health, social security, sports, education and labor.

Now let us briefly go over the institutions of the proposed ‘United Cyprus Republic.’ The executive branch of the new republic was a special type of presidential system and power was vested to the Presidential Council composed of six members of whom at least one-third (two) would come from the Turkish Cypriot state. The President and Vice-president could not be from the same constituent state during the same term and each term was to be 10 months. A president could not serve more than two consecutive terms meaning Greek or Turkish Cypriots could not be in office for more than two consecutive terms.

Members of the Presidential Council would be elected on a single list by special majority<sup>151</sup> in the Senate and approved by simple majority in the Chamber of Deputies (as we shall see below, these are the upper and lower houses of the legislature, respectively). The decisions in the Presidential Council would be reached by consensus. In case of a lack of consensus, the Presidential Council would, unless otherwise specified, take decisions by simple majority of members voting. However, this majority required at least one member from each constituent state which provided each side a “hidden veto” power.<sup>152</sup> This is important especially for the Turkish Cypriots, given that they could be outnumbered one-to-three in the Presidential Council. The members of the Council would be equal and each member would be the head of a department. The heads of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and EU Affairs was not to come from the same Constituent state.

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<sup>150</sup> The Annan Plan, Article 2, par. 4

<sup>151</sup> Voting by ‘special majority’ means two-fifths of sitting members have to vote in favor; this system was integrated into the plan to ensure some check of the Turkish Cypriots on the Greek Cypriot majority.

<sup>152</sup> Sözen, Ahmet, *The Annan Plan: A Model of Governance in Multi-Ethnic Society*, Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, Sept. 9-11, 2004, pg. 22



The legislative branch of the United Cyprus Republic, the federal Parliament, would be composed of two chambers; as mentioned above, these were the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, each comprising 48 members. While the Senate would be composed of an equal number of Senators from each constituent state, the Chamber of Deputies would be composed in proportion to persons holding internal Constituent state citizenship status of each constituent state. For the Chamber of Deputies, each constituent state was to be attributed no less than one quarter of the seats (meaning a minimum 12 seats) with at least one deputy for each of the Maronite, Latin and Armenian communities.<sup>153</sup> Furthermore, the President of the Chamber of Deputies could not be drawn from the same constituent state as its first Vice-President and the President of the Senate. All deputies and senators would be directly elected by the electorate of each state for five year terms; the members of the executive were to be elected for five-year terms as well.

The decisions of the Parliament would require the approval of both chambers by simple majority voting, though votes in the Senate would normally require that they include a quarter of each side's senators present and voting. In legislation dealing with issues of finance, immigration, foreign affairs and election of the executive Presidential Council, the proportion was to be raised to two-fifths of sitting senators from each constituent state; this is the special majority, as explained above.

In regard of the judiciary, the plan foresaw the establishment of constituent state courts, which would be responsible for the judicial issues within the boundaries of the constituent states, and a Supreme Court, which would hold the judiciary power of the federal state. The Supreme Court would have an equal number of judges from each constituent state, and three non-Cypriot judges until otherwise provided by law. The Court would be responsible for resolving disputes between the constituent states or between one or both of them and the federal government, and resolving on an interim basis deadlocks within federal institutions.

As mentioned above, the Annan Plan aimed to be comprehensive, meaning its framework was designed to minimize political and legal vacuums that could endanger the settlement. In this respect, the plan addressed a wide range of issues besides the general structure of the United Cyprus Republic. One such feature was the reference to the composition of public service, which was to be proportional to the population of the constituent states. However, at least one-third of the public servants at every level of the

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<sup>153</sup> The population of the island, according to the US State Department ([www.foia.state.gov](http://www.foia.state.gov)), consists of: Greek-Cypriots 78%, Turkish-Cypriots 18%, Armenian, Maronite and Latin-Cypriots 4%

administration had to be from each constituent state, thus disabling either side from dominating the public sector.

In respect to the Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance, the plan entailed updates which arranged the size and duration of the armed forces of the Guarantor powers (Greece and Turkey) that would be stationed in the island. Contingents from both guarantor countries was permitted to reside in both constituent states in which each contingent would not exceed 6,000 until 2011; each contingent would not exceed 3,000 thereafter until 2018 or until the European Union accession of Turkey, whichever is sooner; and the Greek contingent was not to exceed 950 and the Turkish contingent not to exceed 650 thereafter, subject to three-yearly review with the objective of total withdrawal. In addition, there was to be a Monitoring Committee (composed of representatives of the guarantor powers, the federal government, and the Constituent states, and chaired by the United Nations) which would monitor the implementation of the aforementioned agreements. Furthermore, the island was to be demilitarized, meaning all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, including reserve units, would be dissolved, and their arms removed from the island. In fact, all weapons except licensed sporting guns would be prohibited.

Last but not least we shall review the property settlement and territory arrangements foreseen in the Annan Plan, which are among the most sensitive issues of the Cyprus problem. The plan starts from the premise that compensation is the easiest way to solve the property issue<sup>154</sup> and thus it is designed in such a way as to minimize the number of people who will have to vacate their village or town, if not their actual homes.<sup>155</sup>

The property claims of the dispossessed persons would be received and administered by an independent, impartial Property Board composed of an equal number of members from each constituent state, as well as non-Cypriot members. Arrangements regarding property and territory in the plan were highly complex such that there were deviations and exceptions depending on which community the person came from and whether their property was located in areas where territorial adjustments were to take place. In addition, there were provisions in the plan that put restrictions on the number of Greek Cypriots that could reside in the Turkish Cypriot state and vice-versa, which would affect property settlements. For example, it was stated that Greek Cypriots could constitute after 15 years a maximum of %21 of the population of the Turkish Cypriot state which automatically put limitations to Greek Cypriot

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<sup>154</sup> Compensation was specifically for Cypriots who were displaced following the events of 1963 and 1974.

<sup>155</sup> Anastasakis, Othon; Bertrand, Gilles; Nicoladidis, Kalypso, *Getting to Yes: Suggestions for the Embellishment of the Annan Plan for Cyprus*, St. Antony's College Oxford, SEESP, February, 2004, pg. 3

settlements in certain areas. Some reports state that the number Greek Cypriots would fall within the %21 allowed but estimates regarding property and territorial adjustments vary significantly. Along with the transfer of %7of the territory to the Greek Cypriot state,<sup>156</sup> for example, the UN estimated an overall relocation of 62,000-65,000 persons (47,000 being Turkish Cypriot); The Turkish Cypriot estimate, on the other hand, was 100,000, which amounts to half their population.<sup>157</sup>

Of course another related and problematic issue was the return of immigrants (“settlers”) from TRNC to Turkey, from where they have been coming since 1974. This is a long-standing demand of the Greek Cypriots who perceive immigration from Turkey to TRNC as a policy of “systematic colonization” and Turkish expansionism.<sup>158</sup> In his letter to the UN Secretary-General of 7 June 2004, current Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos claimed that there are 119,000 “...illegally implanted Turkish settlers” in North Cyprus. Papadopoulos argued later on in the same letter that the final version of the UN Plan would have allowed for the entirety of the “settlers” to remain in Cyprus.<sup>159</sup> The plan specified a limitation of 45,000 who could acquire Cypriot citizenship from each side other than those persons who held Cypriot citizenship on 31 December, 1963, their descendants and the spouses of such descendents. However this did not satisfy the Greek Cypriots who, as evidenced from the statements of their governmental officials, wanted the expulsion of all the so-called “settlers”.

### **Reflections on the Annan Plan: A Two-Sided Story**

The Annan Plan roused criticism on both sides which displayed the continuation of mutual distrust. Denktaş’s sudden and surprising decision to partially lift restrictions on the Green Line on April 2003 showed that peaceful exchanges of visits was possible but living side by side, let alone governing a state together, is a different thing which rests on delicate compromises. Perhaps within this context having mutual reservations on a new partnership was unavoidable.

Critics on the Greek Cypriot side perceived the Annan plan as unfair and unbalanced on many aspects, ranging from governmental arrangements to property and refugee

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<sup>156</sup> At the end of the transitional period the allocation of territory between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots would be %70,8 to %29,2 respectively

<sup>157</sup> Dodd, Clement, *Disaccord on Cyprus; The UN Plan and After*, The Eothen Press, 2003, pg. 21

<sup>158</sup> Public Information Office, Turkish Colonization, [www.pio.gov.cy](http://www.pio.gov.cy)

<sup>159</sup> Olgun, Ergün, *Cyprus: Objective Realities, Validity of Greek Cypriot Objections to the Annan Plan, and the Way Forward*, Paper presented for the publication in the *Outre-Terre Revue Francaise de Geopolitique*, Oct. 2004, pg. 5

settlements to guarantee rights. They claimed that the plan was unviable and unworkable and would make Cyprus ungovernable by allowing all governmental organs to be frozen in deadlock to a greater extent than they did in the “imposed” 1960 arrangements. In this respect, they specifically criticized the “minority veto’s” (in other words, the safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots) and claimed that the plan lacked provisions of any practical deadlock resolving mechanisms. In a more general scale, this relates to the “over-representation” of the Turkish Cypriots in the government who, according to hardliner Greek Cypriots, should be vested with minority rights only.

Further dissatisfaction on the Greek Cypriot part was regarding the stationing of Turkish troops in the island. Although this was to be a temporary stationing, as mention in the above section, Greek Cypriot critics have no tolerance for any presence of foreign troops, let alone Turkish troops, which would also have guarantor powers. Overall, these critics oppose the idea of guarantor-ship and claim that the plan does not foresee the demilitarization of the island but on the contrary “effectively place it under the strategic control of Turkey.”<sup>160</sup> The only unobjectionable way for Turkish military presence in Cyprus according to them would be under a multinational UN force or within the framework of the European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP).

As of the Turkish Cypriot “settlers,” the Greek Cypriot claim is that their inhabitation in Cyprus is a result of the Turkish expansionist policy which aims to alter the demographic composition of the island. Their view is that other than certain humanitarian cases (i.e. men and women settlers who married Turkish Cypriots and the offspring of such marriages) these settlers should be given financial assistance towards their repatriation.<sup>161</sup> This of course is a euphemism for “deportation” according to the Turkish side. The Greek Cypriots criticize the Annan Plan for legitimizing all settlers as citizens of the United Cyprus Republic and opening the door to further settlement. Furthermore, it is claimed that “with the passage of time, the danger looms of sweeping demographic changes at the expense of the Greek Cypriots.”<sup>162</sup>

In regard to property and territorial arrangements, the Greek Cypriots criticized the plan for firstly legitimizing to a large extent the “seizure” of properties in the territories under the TRNC. A further point of criticism was that the compensations to be received would be paid by the federal government which essentially meant out of the pockets of the Greek

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<sup>160</sup> Cyprus Institute of European and International Affaires, Newsletter, Kentas, Giorgo, *Security Aspects of the Annan Plan V*, swww.rcenter.intercol.edu

<sup>161</sup> Cyprus Institute of European and International Affaires, Publications, *The Republic of Cyprus as a Member State of the EU and the Solution of the Cyprus Problem*, swww.rcenter.intercol.edu, pg 5

<sup>162</sup> *ibid*, pg 12

Cypriots.<sup>163</sup> The Annan Plan was further bashed due to its provisions over territorial arrangements; while the Greek Cypriots demanded substantial territorial adjustments (%76-%24) with an additional demand for a large part of the coast, the Annan Plan gave their administration %70.8 of the territory (leaving %29,2 to the Turkish Cypriot constituent state).

Turkish Cypriot critics, primarily led by Denктаş, had their share of reservations to the Annan Plan. In short, they claimed that the plan's provisions did not safeguard their existence and political equality. The common state, they said, carried a high danger of being dominated by the Greek Cypriots and that in the long run Turkish Cypriots would become a slim minority in an island which would be economically dominated by Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, territorial arrangements and the status of the settlers would in practice lead to the displacement of one-third to one-half of the Turkish population and "over one-fifth of the population in the Turkish Cypriot state could over time be Greek Cypriot with voting rights in the Turkish Cypriot state."<sup>164</sup>

Let us be more specific about the views of the Turkish Cypriot critiques, as we were with their Greek Cypriot counterparts. In terms of the exercise of political rights, Ergün Olgun, Under-Secretary to the President of TRNC, stressed in a personal interview that if the limitations and exemptions regarding permanent residency<sup>165</sup> are applied as foreseen in the Annan Plan, about one-third, or possibly a larger proportion, of the population of the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State could over time be Greek Cypriots.<sup>166</sup> This is because according to the Annan Plan the exercise of political rights at the Constituent State level is associated with the status of permanent residency.

The Annan Plan does embody safeguards to hinder the dominance of one community over the other but these apparently are not sufficient to either side. The principle of bi-zonality for example was to be protected by providing a gradual approach to the establishment of residency by Greek Cypriots returning to the Turkish Cypriot State. For six years, there would be a total moratorium (with certain exceptions). After that, limitations could be imposed by the constituent states so that even after 15 years, new residencies could be limited if 21% of the population in any given village came from the other constituent state. Olgun claimed that though the plan theoretically intended to protect the Turkish Cypriot community, its application would result "in the Greek Cypriot Constituent State to be overwhelmingly Greek Cypriot while condemning the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State to be, at best,

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<sup>163</sup> The UN Annan Plan Proposal For the Settlement of the Cyprus Question, <http://unannanplan.agrino.org>

<sup>164</sup> Dodd, Clement, *Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After*, The Eothen Press, 2003, pg. 21

<sup>165</sup> The Annan Plan, Enclosure 1 for article 6 and Enclosure 2

<sup>166</sup> Interview, Ergün Olgun, June 2004

extensively mixed and consequently at the mercy of both the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and its own numerous Greek Cypriot residents.”<sup>167</sup> It is claimed that under such circumstances, the allowable limitations and exemptions on residency would in practice nullify the mutually agreed principles of bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality.

The arrangements proposed regarding territory, property and citizenship also stirred criticism among some the Turkish Cypriot circles. According to Olgun’s research and claim, the arrangements would result in the displacement of up to 90,000-100,000 TRNC citizens, amounting to about half of TRNC population,<sup>168</sup> which does not match the aforementioned UN estimate of 62,000-65,000. The discrepancy between the two estimates, according to Olgun, is because the UN did not adequately cover the persons to be displaced due to the exercise of the right of return of the Greek Cypriots and the citizenship arrangements.<sup>169</sup>

The property arrangements of the Annan Plan also contain threats to the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community according to some critiques. In attempting to resolve the property issue, the plan introduced reinstatement and long term lease as two key options (together with compensation, sale and exchange). Olgun claims that these options, together with the permissible relations on the establishment of residence, are sufficient to significantly undermine bi-zonality, which is perceived by Turkish Cypriots as a basic physical, political and economic security need.<sup>170</sup>

The negative perception of Denktaş and his political circle have not changed regarding the Annan Plan; the President did not budge and continues to pursue a hard-line stance but this reflected neither on TRNC public opinion or the Turkish government under Tayyip Erdogan. In January and February 2003 large pro-EU demonstrations took place in the north but Denktaş did not abandon his stance, refusing to put the Annan Plan to a popular referendum in TRNC in April 2003. He was then effectively sidelined when his supporters lost parliamentary elections in December 2003,<sup>171</sup> paving the way to the creation of a more “compromising,” pro-EU government under current Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat.<sup>172</sup>

Remember that talks over the Annan Plan had started with Clerides in January 2002. Politicians, analysts and the media had repeatedly declared that before 16 February 2003 that

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<sup>167</sup> Olgun, Ergün, Conference: The Annan Plan-Myths and Realities, Ceylan Intercontinental Hotel, Istanbul, July 2003

<sup>168</sup> ibid

<sup>169</sup> ibid

<sup>170</sup> Interview, Ergün Olgun, June 2004

<sup>171</sup> The latest (Feb. 2005) parliamentary elections were no different with PM Mehmet Ali Talat’s Republican Turkish Party gaining %44 and its counterpart National Unity Party gaining %32.

<sup>172</sup> Talat is expected to be the next President, following the April 2005 Presidential elections, thus ending an era of Denktaş’s presidency.

the final outcome of the Presidential elections in the Greek side would constitute in reality a referendum on the Annan Plan. And so it did; when Tassos Papadopoulos achieved a clear victory over Clerides (%51.51 vs. %38.80). Thus it was no surprise when the outcome of the simultaneous referenda on April 24 2004 revealed a clear “Oxi” (“No”) to the Annan Plan (with %75.8) on the Greek side and the exact opposite result (%64.9 “Yes”) on the Turkish Cypriot side.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The final segment of this paper comprises two headlines, the former recapitulating and highlighting the critical junctures of the Cyprus dispute and the latter assessing these with references to latest developments and within the framework of conflict resolution literature.

#### A Recap

The high degree of inter-communal discord in the Cyprus of the 1950s, coupled with a bloody struggle against the British for independence, gave birth to the Constitution of 1960 and the independent Republic of Cyprus. The settlement however was not the end but the beginning of further internal strife fueled by the intensification of the enosis movement, primarily organized under EOKA. The Turkish Cypriots in turn organized under TMT and demanded partition of the island, hence triggering a further polarization between the two communities.

The newly established bi-communal state recognized the Turkish Cypriots as a political community with special rights that exceeded their demographic proportion to the Greek Cypriots; this left Greek Cypriot nationalists disappointed and the friction between the two communities grew.<sup>173</sup> The infamous demand of Makarios to amend 13 articles of the constitutional in 1963 made it evident that there was a big discrepancy in the conception of power-sharing between the two communities. In short, the Greek Cypriot leadership wanted Turkish Cypriots to be in a minority status rather than equal partners. In addition, there is overwhelming concrete evidence pointing to Greek Cypriot aspirations of enosis before, and more intensely, after the declaration of independence. Violent unrest, such as the 1963 massacres, led the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) to prevent recurrence of such atrocities and to restore law and order.

A vicious circle of attacks, counter-attacks and brief cease-fires between the two communities was the reality of Cyprus throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. These were the most turbulent years of the conflict. The Turkish Cypriots were dominated politically and territorially by the Greek Cypriots and consequently had to reside in enclaves. The Turkish Cypriot representatives withdrew from the parliament and other state institutions but the Republic of Cyprus continued to “function” as a legal entity.

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<sup>173</sup> Loizos, Peter. “Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus.” *Man* 23, 1988, pgs. 639-653



In the mean time, the junta regime in Athens was far from friendly terms with the Greek Cypriot leadership, specifically Makarios. Consequently, the Greek junta devised a coup which provoked Turkey to intervene in 1974, acting under the rights granted by the Treaty of Guarantee.

The Green Line which was drawn as a result of the intervention persists to this day and determines the boundaries of the two ethnic zones. Successive initiatives, namely the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, to reach a commonly agreed solution to the problem failed, resulting in the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983.

The unilateral declaration of independence failed to achieve international recognition and thus the TRNC, commonly referred as the 'occupied area' by Greek Cypriots, has been doomed with isolation in every aspect ever since. Bi-communal negotiations continued following the birth of TRNC, primarily under UN auspices. The 1980s entailed several rounds of proximity talks, high-level summits and the drafting and redrafting of framework agreements, all of which failed to produce a positive outcome.

UN efforts continued throughout the 1990s, and a glimmer of hope appeared especially in 1992 with the 'Set of Ideas' and later with the Troutbeck and Glion talks but all to no avail. The 1990s is deemed more significant in the Cyprus conflict due to the application of the Cypriot 'government' to the then European Community, now the EU, for full membership, and this opened up a new phase in the conflict.

Since 1974 all attempts to mediate between the parties, most of them undertaken through the auspices of the UN, failed because of the irreconcilable viewpoints of the antagonists and their lack of will to compromise. The EU came into the picture to break the decades of deadlock but its supposed 'catalyst effect' did not turn out as expected, at least for the Turkish Cypriot side. As explained in the relevant sections above, the controversy of EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict does not revolve around the question of *why* it intervened but *how* it intervened. The subsequent UN initiative with the Annan Plan was the last of the chain of failures, though it should be stressed that this failure is not independent of the EU effect.

The positive response of the TRNC public in the April 2004 referendum failed to ameliorate their status; the TRNC continues to be isolated from the international community, which carries paramount political, social and economic consequences, while their Greek Cypriot counterparts have joined the EU, despite their rejection of the Annan Plan, and continue to represent the island in its entirety.

In the mean time, owing to the Copenhagen European Council of December 2004, Turkey will be signing a protocol in October 2005 as a prerequisite for the initiation of accession negotiations. The significance of this protocol in respect to Cyprus is that Turkey will be extending its Customs Union engagement so as to encompass the new EU members and thus the “Republic of Cyprus.” While the Greek Cypriots claim this entails an act of recognition, Turkey begs to differ, as they have declared in more than several occasions, including the conclusion of the Copenhagen Council. This situation resembles the one between China and Taiwan, in which the former declines to recognize the latter but engages in cultural and economic activities.

Reflecting on past experiences and given the circumstances created by EU involvement, it is hard to be optimistic regarding the resolution of the Cyprus problem in the near future. It seems the current Greek Cypriot leadership does not want the UN to act as mediator and instead want the EU to take up this role. In addition, it has been stated by Greek Cypriot officials that the Annan Plan is no longer the desired framework for negotiations. In any case, Greek Cypriots, having secured their EU membership, would demand significant changes in a plan that they already rejected and this in turn would be unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. There is no doubt that the two sides will sit around the negotiation table in the near future, most probably around the critical date of October 2005, but in the light of the past and recent developments, this, it seems, is going to be recorded in history as yet another futile attempt.

## **An Assessment within the framework of CR Literature**

Compromising is such an adjustment of conflicting interests as gives each adversary the satisfaction of thinking he has got what he ought not to have, and is deprived of nothing except what was justly his due.

**Ambrose Bierce (1842-1914)**

Some disputes, if properly controlled over a period of time, ultimately wither into insignificance. In other disputes, however, a long cooling-off period may actually lead the parties to adopt more rigid and uncompromising positions, and the prospects for reasonable compromise gradually diminish.<sup>174</sup> Unfortunately, the latter part of this statement has been the reality for Cyprus. We have seen in the above sections that each party has been consistently accusing each other of adopting unyielding negotiation positions, and thus every negotiation and mediation effort since the beginning of the conflict has proven to be in vain.

As stated in the introductory paragraphs of the paper, there are some basic principles that carve the path to successful negotiation and mediation, one of which is symmetry. As the word itself implies, symmetry in negotiations means that negotiating parties have veto powers and this condition provides the situation of power equality.<sup>175</sup> Zartman defines symmetry as both the goal and the assumption of successful negotiation because parties negotiate most productively when they feel equal and they achieve the most satisfactory results when they view the process as fair.<sup>176</sup> In contrary situations, such as in power asymmetry, the stronger side will exploit the weaknesses and desperation of the other side and negotiate on a take it or leave it basis.<sup>177</sup>

The case of Cyprus has been prone to power asymmetry since the beginning of the conflict. Let us succinctly recount the developments that led to the partition of the island; the breach of the 1960 agreements by the Greek Cypriots led to the violent events of 1963 whereupon the Turkish Cypriots were pushed into enclaves and the government went on “functioning” without Turkish Cypriot presence; the Greek coup attempt gave way to the Turkish intervention in 1974; the Turkish Cypriots declared Northern Cyprus to be a federated state in 1975 and later, in 1983, TRNC was proclaimed.

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<sup>174</sup> Inis, L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problem and Progress of International Organization*, New York, Random House, 1971, pg 238

<sup>175</sup> Rubin, J., Z., and Brown, B., R., *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation*, New York: Academic Press, 1975

<sup>176</sup> Zartman, I. W., and Maureen R. Berman. *The Practical Negotiator*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982

<sup>177</sup> Olgun, Ergün, Conference: The Annan Plan-Myths and Realities, Ceylan Intercontinental Hotel, Istanbul, July 2003

From 1963 onward, international recognition has been granted to the “government of Cyprus,” despite the fact that it was the Greek Cypriot leadership that unilaterally abrogated the 1959 agreements and 1960 constitution. The UN portrayed partiality in favor of the Greek Cypriot leadership in every step of the way; starting from 1963 the Greek Cypriot administration has been treated as the government of Cyprus; in 1975 the UN “regretted” the establishment of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State;<sup>178</sup> and in 1983 denounced the declaration of TRNC.<sup>179</sup> The Greek Cypriot government has thus been representing the whole island since 1963, occupying the Cyprus chair in all international institutions, embargoing Turkish Cypriot international trade, and driving the Turkish Cypriots into isolation in every aspect.

It is of paramount importance to stress that the aforementioned Turkish/Turkish Cypriot acts, which are perceived as acts of partition by some, should not have necessarily gained the approval of national and international actors. I am simply pointing to the fact that while these supposed acts of partition were being condemned, the evident enosis policy of the Greek Cypriots was not. As a result of this favorable treatment, this double-standard, the Greek Cypriots have become the stronger party and thus hold a much stronger position in negotiations. This lies at the heart of the asymmetrical relationship that has lingered to this day.

This asymmetry has become wider within the passed decade due to the EU catalyst. Owing to the flow of events mentioned above, the Greek Cypriot administration applied to the EU for full membership in the name of the whole island. The EU approach was embedded in the aforementioned UN discourse, where the Greek Cypriot government is recognized as the only legitimate one, and where non-state actors (TRNC) have no access.<sup>180</sup> As emphasized in more than one occasion in the earlier sections of the paper, the controversy of EU involvement in the Cyprus problem rises not because *why* it intervened but *how* it intervened.

The EU policy to take on a more proactive political role in global affairs has become apparent within the passed decade. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) emerged as the second pillar of the EU in 1993 in Maastricht, this gradually evolved and in June 1999 the Cologne European Council decided that the EU, without detracting from NATO operations, should be able to take decisions and to act autonomously in the fields of conflict prevention and crisis management. Thus emerged the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as

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<sup>178</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 367

<sup>179</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 541 and 550

<sup>180</sup> Diez, Tomas, *Last Exit to Paradise? The EU, the Cyprus Conflict, and the Problematic ‘Catalyst Effect,’* Copenhagen Research Institute, June 2000, pg. 13

the military dimension of CFSP. In addition, the Union established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), showing its commitment to peace and stability in the region.

We thus have considerable evidence demonstrating EU's motivation to exert itself in world politics, specifically in the fields of conflict prevention and resolution. However motivation alone does not necessarily bring effectiveness, as we have clearly seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s and more recently in Cyprus.

First and foremost, the unanimity voting system can work against decision-making processes in the EU. We have already emphasized the "Greek blackmail" to veto EU's enlargement project. The Greek Foreign Minister declared in November 1996 that "if Cyprus is not admitted, then there will be no enlargement of the Community."<sup>181</sup> Naturally any such less than ethic liaison is officially being rejected by the Greeks and the EU flank. Interestingly enough, Turkey itself got entangled in such games, specifically during the highly criticized 1995 'trade-off' when Turkish PM Çiller's government turned a deaf ear to EU decisions over Cyprus so that it could avoid the Greek veto preventing it from getting into the Customs Union.

Having its 'motherland' as an insider, and having secured EU membership, the Greek Cypriots undoubtedly gained leverage on the negotiating table. Third-party decisions can often make the difference between agreement and no agreement, between a sound agreement and a temporary settlement, or between a satisfying negotiation process and a tension-filled confrontation; these decisions can strongly influence the progress that disputing parties make toward resolving their problems.<sup>182</sup> We have seen that the EU displayed a leniency to accept Cyprus, a conflict-torn island, into the Union from the very beginning; starting from the application for full membership, every EU decision henceforth brought the Greek Cypriots closer to the Union, giving them a serious edge in their negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. Especially after 1995 it became clear that the EU would accept Cyprus into the Union *without* the precondition of a settlement.

While analyzing EU involvement in Cyprus as a third party we should acknowledge that in mediation the perceived role of the mediator by the disputants is of paramount importance for the success of the mediation. Thus, when the EU lost credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Turks, their relations became extremely severed, as became evident from the various Turkish-TRNC joint declarations in the 1990s. Berchovitch states

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<sup>181</sup> Cyprus news, no. 87. London: Cyprus High Commission, November 1996

<sup>182</sup> Broome, Benjamin J., Murray, John S., *Improving Third-Party Decisions at Choice Points: A Cyprus Case Study*, Negotiation Journal, Plenum Pub. Co., Jan. 2002, pgs. 75-75

that the mediator should be seen as impartial, acceptable to the disputants and deserving their trust.<sup>183</sup> Paralleling this, Kochan claims that a premature use of active strategies is not without risk; it may ruin the mediator's credibility and acceptability.<sup>184</sup> EU's incapacity to act as an effective conflict resolution actor, its inability to behave in a neutral manner (as we shall further elaborate below) and its intervention in Cyprus the way it did, has cost the Union its credibility in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriots.

We have seen that EU aspiration to create a positive catalyst effect in Cyprus was not matched by their methods. The aforementioned 'Community method' of promoting political solutions through the prospect of economic advantages was enough to get a "Yes" from TRNC in the April 2004 referendum (despite its lack of credibility as a third party) but it back-fired in the case of the Greek Cypriots. This might not have been the case if the Greek Cypriots were not guaranteed EU membership beforehand.

As stated by Folberg and Taylor, mediation is "the process which the participants, together with the assistance of a *neutral* person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a unanimous settlement that will accommodate their needs."<sup>185</sup> Thus far, the EU has not been able to portray a neutral position in its dealing with Cyprus. Using Rubin's classification of mediator roles, the EU falls into the category of "partial" mediator, which, as is evident from the word, is a non-neutral role.<sup>186</sup> We can further state that the EU falls under Zartman and Touval's definition of "manipulative mediator;" a mediator that not only adds his own ideas but *also* his own power to move the disputants towards an agreement.<sup>187</sup> EU has not only put considerable effort in the design of the latest Annan Plan but has been using the 'Community method,' its political and economic appeal, to stir TRNC into agreement.<sup>188</sup> This method is generally referred to as

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<sup>183</sup> Bercovitch, Jacob, 'Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice', in William I. Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds, *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1977, pg. 141

<sup>184</sup> Kochan, T.A., Step-by-step in the Middle East from the perspective of the labor mediation process. In J.Z. Rubin (Ed.), *Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East*, New York: Praeger, 1981 pgs.122-135.

<sup>185</sup> Folberg, J. and Taylor, A., *Mediation*, San Fransisco: Jossey Bass, 1984, pg.7

<sup>186</sup> Rubin, J., Z., Introduction. In Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Ed.), *Dynamics of Third Party Intervention*, New York: Praeger, 1981.

<sup>187</sup> Zartman, I., W., and Touval, S., International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1985. Vol.41, pp.27-45

<sup>188</sup> Economic development has been hampered to a large degree due to the international isolation and the resulting embargoes. Today, Greek Cypriots enjoy a per capita income that is more than three times that of Turkish Cypriots, and this naturally increases EU's appeal in the eyes of the latter to a large degree.

power mediation, a mediation method which adds the use of leverage through promised benefits or threatened punishments to a negotiation.<sup>189</sup>

Currently, one of the parties has gained EU membership, its counterpart is still unrecognized and isolated despite a show of will to settle, and the ‘motherland’ of the latter is anxiously awaiting the initiation of accession negotiations. Even when the names and history of these parties are put aside, it is evident that foundations for healthy negotiations are not present. Turkey is responsible for completing 31 chapters during its accession negotiation talks and member Cyprus has a veto during the opening and closing of every chapter. In addition, the EU and the rest of the international community have not rewarded the positive response of TRNC following the April 2004 referendum in any way; a year has gone by and the long-standing isolation persists.

As pledged in the December 2004 European Copenhagen Council, Turkey will extend its Customs Union (CU) engagement to the Republic of Cyprus, though without recognition. However, this process does not finalize with the signature of Turkey alone; there is a complicated procedure within the EU before it can be ratified. The text of this agreement has to pass through the Coreper,<sup>190</sup> the European Parliament and the Council. Of course, there are no guarantees that there will be no Greek Cypriot opposition, or even veto, during this procedure. One of the main reasons for a potential Greek Cypriot opposition is their demand for Turkey to open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships, which is being rejected by Turkey on the grounds that though Turkey is in the CU, Turkish citizens are not granted freedom of movement in the EU. Hence, engaging in CU with the Greek Cypriots does not necessitate giving them the right to free movement, and for that matter, access to Turkish ports.

Having a firm grip over the EU card, it does not seem probable that the Greek Cypriots are going to yield in their relations with Turkey or the TRNC. Since all mediation involves negotiations among the conflicting parties themselves, as well as between them and the intermediary, the granting of concessions from both sides is an essential requirement.<sup>191</sup> Since the current circumstances serve the Greek Cypriot interests, and since there is an asymmetrical power relationship, the Greek Cypriots are not willing to give any concessions (or at least concessions that match the concessions of TRNC).

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<sup>189</sup> Fisher, Ronald J., *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution*. New York: Springer, 1990.

<sup>190</sup> The Coreper is a body constituted of Permanent Representatives, with the rank of ambassador, from each member state.

<sup>191</sup> Mirbagheri, Farid, *Cyprus and International Peace Making*, C.Hurst & Co. London, 1998, pg. 1

As Carpenter and Kennedy state, the key is to convince the parties that negotiation offers the greatest potential benefits, and that the costs of pursuing other options or continuing the conflict are too high.<sup>192</sup> Since the Greek Cypriots are in a stronger negotiating position, a lack of agreement with TRNC will hurt them less than TRNC itself, and thus, the chance of giving concessions on the Greek Cypriot part diminishes. Paralleling this, the study of Lax and Sebenius claim that the tougher a negotiator, the greater his chance of getting an agreement close to his position, but less his chance of getting an agreement at all.<sup>193</sup> Abiding to this hypothesis, the Greek Cypriots have been standing firm on their ground, with minimum concessions, but as the hypotheses postulates, the other side of the coin is that there will be no agreement at all.

As we have established, a major reason for Greek Cypriot leadership to be uncooperative in negotiations, specifically recently with the Annan Plan, is due to the asymmetry in the inter-party relations. To be able to achieve symmetry, it is an absolute necessity for the EU to use its leverage. Using Zartman and Touval's categorization of the kinds of leverages, we can say that the EU has been exerting a strategy of "deprivation" on TRNC; depriving them of EU membership and its benefits.<sup>194</sup> Olgun refers to this policy as "hostage habituated behavior."<sup>195</sup> We have seen the effectiveness of this strategy through the pro-EU rallies, the change of governments from hard-liners to "pro-European Unionists," and finally through the results of the April 2004 referendum.

However, it is the act of depriving one party and not the other that creates the asymmetry. If both parties were deprived of EU membership for instance, the grounds for negotiations would have been better. Such a case resembles the Hurting Stalemate model, suggested by Zartman and developed by Stedman.<sup>196</sup> According to this model, disputants mostly seek a negotiated solution when no successful outcome from the current situation has been envisioned. In short, the higher the cost of continued stalemate, the higher the possibility for the disputant to show leniency to negotiate. As observed in the Cyprus case, it is solely the

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<sup>192</sup> Carpenter, Susan L. and W.J.D. Kennedy, *Managing Public Disputes*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988, pgs. 224-257

<sup>193</sup> Lax, D., A., and Sebenius, J.,K., *Interests: the Measure of Negotiations*. In Roy Lewicki, Joseph A. Litterer, David M. Saunders and John W. Minton (Eds.) *Negotiation: Readings, Exercises and Cases*, Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1986.

<sup>194</sup> Zartman, I., W., and Touval, S., *International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era*. In Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall (Eds.) *Managing Global Chaos*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, pp. 445-461.

<sup>195</sup> Interview, Ergün Olgun, June 2004

<sup>196</sup> C.R. Mitchell, *Cutting Losses: Reflections on Appropriate Timing*, Working Paper 9, Virginia: ICAR, 1996, pg. 2



TRNC that gets “hurt” from the stalemate and hence it was them and not the Greek Cypriot side that accepted the Annan settlement.

In order to balance the positions of the parties to create better grounds for negotiations, the international community and especially the EU has to exert some leverage and strengthen the TRNC position. There have been some talks of lifting or relaxing the years-long embargo on TRNC so that its isolation can be broken to a degree. Especially after the referenda, Turkey and TRNC expected the UN and EU to take initiatives along the aforementioned lines, so that a catalyst effect to move the Greek Cypriots into agreement would be created. Olgun stressed that the international community has to change the game plan and paradigms surrounding the Cyprus issue by leveling the playing field and empowering the equal status and legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot polity.<sup>197</sup>

Immediately following the referenda, leading international figures and organizations repeatedly stressed the importance of breaking TRNC isolation. EU enlargement commissioner Guenter Verheugen said the referenda results meant Greek Cyprus would enter the bloc under a “shadow.” The commissioner later stated that “Turkish Cypriots must not be punished because of this result...Now we have to end the isolation on the North. The Commission is ready to take various measures for that aim.”<sup>198</sup> Tony Blair similarly emphasized that “We made it clear we must act now to end the isolation of Northern Cyprus. That means lifting the embargoes in respect to trade, in respect to air travel...”<sup>199</sup> International organizations made declarations along the same lines, as the UN Secretary-General stated he hoped “the members of the Council can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development...”<sup>200</sup> On the other hand, the European Parliamentary Assembly declared that “the international community and in particular the Council of Europe and the European Union cannot ignore or betray the expressed desire of the majority of Turkish Cypriots for greater openness and should take rapid and appropriate steps to encourage it. The Turkish Cypriots’ international isolation must cease.”<sup>201</sup> One year has gone by and despite these declarations no action has been taken by the

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<sup>197</sup> Olgun, Ergün, Conference: The Annan Plan-Myths and Realities, Ceylan Intercontinental Hotel, Istanbul, July 2003

<sup>198</sup> Gunter Verheugen, EU Enlargement Commissioner, 26 April 2004

<sup>199</sup> Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the UK, during his visit to Turkey, 18 May 2004

<sup>200</sup> Secretary-General’s Report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus to the Security Council, 28 May 2004, S/2004/437, pg. 2

<sup>201</sup> The European Parliamentary Assembly Resolution no. 1376 (2004)

international community to relieve TRNC of its political, social and economic isolation to any degree.

Although balancing the positions of the parties through the aforementioned means would give way to better negotiation conditions, the current impasse does not give much hope for any such breakthrough. Having given the main reasons for unsuccessful reconciliation attempts and having established that the big actors such as EU and UN are unlikely to take action to counterweigh the Greek Cypriot hand, what would be a realistic step to increase the chances of resolution?

Although this paper focuses on official mediation and negotiation efforts in Cyprus, the ineffective EU and UN undertakings thus far leads one to search for hope elsewhere, namely unofficial interventions. Starting from the mid-1960s the Cyprus conflict received attention from conflict analysts, however, these were unofficial interventions which have been characterized by a lack of continuity and/or connection to both the decision-making level and official mediation efforts. Thus, these attempts are best seen as initial demonstrations as to what a different approach to conflict management might provide to this protracted social conflict.<sup>202</sup> Although these interventions have not proven to be very fruitful thus far, they have a potential to stimulate bottom-up, citizen movements for peace; something which lacks in top-to-bottom method of UN and EU.

The common factor of these unofficial interventions was that virtually all aimed to build a bridge of trust and understanding between the communities so that reconciliation could be better conceived. Thus, increasing communication and interaction was key to these initiatives. To state a few, John Burton applied his *controlled communication* method (1966) that brought representatives from each community to discuss their differing perceptions of the conflict and their evaluations of directions towards resolution; in 1974, Leonard Doob brought together some twenty Turkish and Greek Cypriot influentials for a workshop that was designed to build trust and understanding and to stimulate creative ideas for reaching a settlement, however the workshop was cancelled along with the 1974 coup; in 1979 and 1984, Herbert Kelman brought together less influential participants to assess attitudes and how these might be changed, and to suggest arrangements to lessen the impact of negative attitudes on the conflict. More recently, during the 1990s, Fisher organized a series of conflict analysis workshops where once again Greek and Turkish Cypriots were brought together. The focus was on establishing dialogue (in terms of business, education, etc.), analyzing the conflict and

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<sup>202</sup> Fisher, Roland J., *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, *Journal of Peace Research*, 2001, Vol. 38, pg. 317.

its escalation, and creating ideas for de-escalation and resolution. The participants exchanged useful perceptions, came to some shared realizations, and built consensus on the nature of a renewed understanding necessary to resolve the conflict.<sup>203</sup>

In-depth analysis of unofficial interventions is out of the scope of this paper, but simply put, they tried to establish dialogue through a variety of training workshops, whether it be directed towards educators, businessmen, students, policy leaders, etc.. The effect of these interventions on the official mediation and negotiation efforts was not optimum basically because they were not very well connected to key decision-makers (Denktaş, Clerides, etc.) or the official diplomatic track. However, they did contribute to the growing citizen peace-building movement, which brings us to the aforementioned bottom-up influences to conflict resolution.

Starting from the mid-1990s, the Cyprus Consortium and Benjamin Broome organized workshops that aimed at contributing to the social peace-building process with the aforementioned method of building dialogue.<sup>204</sup> Broome's initial bi-communal group of 32 gradually expanded to an estimated 1,500 people, involved in various bi-communal activities.<sup>205</sup> However, in December of 1997, due to the friction created in the Luxembourg Summit, the authorities in the north stopped giving permission for Turkish Cypriots to cross the Green Line into the UN buffer zone, where most bi-communal events were held. Until recently, peaceful exchange of visits between the north and south had been frozen; as mentioned earlier, Denktaş's sudden and surprising decision to partially lift restrictions on the Green Line on April 2003 was a breakthrough.

Even partial lifting of border restrictions has tremendous positive effects on bi-communal peace activities. As Anastasiou points out, "non-communication" adds to the intractability of the conflict. He states that freeing communication from its entrapments particularly in the context of the emergence of bi-communal citizen peace movements is crucial; it shows how the germinating inter-ethnic dialogue in the spirit of peace-seeking rapprochement is commencing a process of deconstructing the traditional forms of conflictual,

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<sup>203</sup> *ibid*, pg. 319

<sup>204</sup> In 1994, IMTD and NTL were joined by the Conflict Management Group (CMG), with co-direction provided by Diana Chigas, to form the Cyprus Consortium.

<sup>205</sup> Broom, Benjamin J., *Designing a Collective Approach to Peace: Interactive Design and Problem Solving Workshops with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities in Cyprus*, *International Negotiation* 2: 381–407, 1997

nationalist discourse while opening up new vistas of understanding, possibilities, and vision for the future.<sup>206</sup>

Broome and Druckman similarly state that adversaries tend to be more cooperative and willing to move further from their initial positions following a stimulated workshop where value differences are discussed. Furthermore, such interventions are likely to produce both increased understanding of the other's values and positions as well as increased liking for the other's group.<sup>207</sup>

We have already emphasized that the "collective memory" specific to the experiences of pain and injury in each community, in other words, each side's historical memory and conviction that history has done it injustice, acts as an immense hurdle on the way to reconciliation. Lack of communication and increased polarization will naturally hinder the alleviation of such convictions. Ben and Amir have conducted experimental studies on inter-group contact using subjects from a variety of cultural backgrounds, and have shown that increased information about another culture leads to more positive attitudes about them.<sup>208</sup>

Despite the lack of positive effects on official mediation and negotiations, the abovementioned workshops, citizen movements and simple inter-group interaction has clearly given way to a higher degree of understanding and tolerance on a citizen level. These activities will *at least* contribute to the implementation of negotiated agreements simply because they serve to prepare the population for cooperation.<sup>209</sup>

Thus far, we have established that breaking TRNC isolation is crucial in creating a more suitable negotiation environment. In the latter part of the conclusion, we have established that constructive interaction between adversaries serves to end hostile perceptions of one-another. In either case, isolation stands in the way of reconciliation. Hence, the mediation/negotiation literature analysis in the first part of the last section and the analysis of the unofficial interventions in the latter section come to the same conclusion that isolation of one community (in this case TRNC) hinders reconciliation. Despite the fact that restrictions have been partially lifted on the Green line since 2003, this serves only for citizen exchange, and not a true economic or political interaction. Furthermore, the act of visiting entails a much

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<sup>206</sup> Anastasiou, Harry, Communication Across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 39, no. 3, 2002

<sup>207</sup> Broom, Benjamin J., Druckman, Daniel, *Value Differences and Conflict Resolution, Familiarity or Liking?*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45 No. 4, 571-593, Dec. 1991

<sup>208</sup> Ben-Ari, R., and Y. Amir. 1988. *Intergroup contact, cultural information, and change in ethnic attitudes*. In *The social psychology of intergroup conflict: Theory, research, and applications*, edited by W. Stroebe, A.W. Kruglanski, D. Bar-Tal, and M. Hewstone, 151-65. Berlin: Springer-Verlag

<sup>209</sup> Broom, Benjamin J., *Reaching Across the Dividing Line: Building a Collective Vision for Peace in Cyprus*, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 2, 2004 pp. 191-209

more limited interaction level than living side-by-side, hence, social interaction is limited in this sense. Nevertheless, even this limited interaction along with citizen-led peace reconciliation activities, carry a potential to plant seeds of peace in the face of ineffective (and even damaging) UN/EU-led interventions. Unofficial intervention and social interaction are not suggested to be substitutes of official efforts, however, the asymmetric and unhealthy negotiation environment created by the latter, and the fact that a change in this environment is highly unlikely in the short-run, leads one to search for hope elsewhere. It is hoped that citizen-led peace-search activities and a higher degree of interaction will give way to bottom-up movements that will crack open the door to reconciliation and perhaps even facilitate official efforts to ultimately coordinate and unite official and unofficial interventions on the bridge of resolution.

# APPENDIX I

## Maps

### Location Map



### Detailed Map



## APPENDIX II

**1) Public Service:** The Turkish Cypriots required that the 70:30 proportion should be attained within five months of independence as had in fact been stipulated in a pre-independence agreement between the President-elect and the Vice- President-elect. The Greek Cypriots in the Public Service Commission argued that they could not overnight draw from 18 % of the population which was poorly qualified suitable candidates to fill 30% of the jobs.

**2) The Cypriot Army:** The Turkish Cypriot Minister of Defense, proposed an army of five battalions, each of three companies. The proposition stipulated that the battalion level should be mixed, but at the company level the units should be from one community or the other. The majority of the Cabinet decided that on the contrary the units should be mixed at every level whereupon the Vice- President used his power of final veto. The Greek Cypriot President then decided not to have an army at all.

**3) Foreign Policy and the Status of the Vice-President:** The Vice-President had absolute veto power over foreign policy. Küçük claimed that owing to this right he should be well informed about foreign policy issues. He protested at not being showed papers regarding foreign policy matters by Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou and strongly objected to Makarios adopting a policy of non-alignment without Turkish Cypriot consent and going to the Belgrade non-aligned summit without his agreement.

**4) Taxes:** A majority vote of the Turkish deputies in the House was needed to pass tax legislation and this gave Turkish Cypriots a bargaining power in the government. Turkish Cypriots sought to use this leverage to attain Greek Cypriot compliance over various issues, such as the Seventy-Thirty ratio, over legislation for separate municipalities, and a more generous approach towards the grant of subsidy to the Turkish Communal Chamber. The gist of the dispute was that the Greek Cypriots wanted a permanent tax law whereas the Turkish Cypriots wanted it renewable annually, which would enable them to use their bargaining power each session.

**5) Separate Municipalities:** Article 173 of the constitution stated that separate municipalities should be created in the five main towns of Cyprus by their Turkish inhabitants.<sup>210</sup> This article was incorporated in the Zurich Agreement and was therefore considered a basic article of the constitution. However, it was never implemented. The question of how the five municipalities of Nicosia, Limmasol, Famagusta, Paphos, and Kyrenia would be governed was one of the most disputed topics between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and it lay at the heart of the dysfunctional and distrustful relationship of the two. The issue of municipal administration was seen as an arena to establish dominance over the island's overall administration and control, it was thus associated with enosis and partition, respectively. This dispute, like the others mentioned above, was never resolved.

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<sup>210</sup> Draft Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Appendix D, Cyprus, Cmnd 1093

## **APPENDIX III**

### **10 Point Agreement**

- 1.** Inter-communal talks would be resumed on 15 June, 1979.
- 2.** The basis for the talks would be the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the UN resolution relevant to the Cyprus question.
- 3.** There should be respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.
- 4.** The talks would deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.
- 5.** Priority would be given to reaching agreement on the settlement of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreements on Varosha had been reached it would be implemented without awaiting the outcome of discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.
- 6.** Any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks would be avoided and special importance would be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.
- 7.** The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus was envisaged and matters relating thereto would be discussed.
- 8.** The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.
- 9.** The inter-communal talks would be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.
- 10.** The inter-communal talks would take place in Nicosia.



## APPENDIX IV

### Five Point Plan

1. No further step to internationalize the Cyprus problem will be undertaken, and initiatives now underway will not be pursued.
2. There will be no follow-up to 15 November 1983 declaration by the Turkish Cypriots, and initiatives currently underway would not be pursued.
3. Both sides will make reciprocal commitments to the Secretary-General not to increase qualitatively or quantitatively the military forces in the island. They would also agree to a system of verification inspections by UNFICYP.
4. The Turkish Cypriot authorities will transfer the Varosha area...to the Secretary-General, who will place it under interim United Nations administration, as part of the buffer zone controlled by UNFICYP. The transfer will be affected in phases over a period of six to nine months, to be agreed upon between His Excellency, Mr Denktas, and the Secretary-General and announced at the time of a high-level meeting. It is understood that the area will not revert to the jurisdiction of the Greek Cypriots until a final agreement on a settlement of the Cyprus problem has been reached. No armed personnel other than UNFICYP will have access to this area.
5. The parties will agree to accept a call by the Secretary-General for the holding of a high-level meeting and to the reopening of the inter-communal dialogue.

## APPENDIX V

### CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, N° S/26026 July 1, 1993

1. Expert co-operation on the short-term and long-term water problem in Cyprus, in particular, increasing the water supply.
2. Expert co-operation on education, in particular to promote inter-communal harmony and friendship.
3. Joint cultural and sports events, including the joint use of the Cetinkaya field in the buffer zone near the Ledra Palace Hotel.
4. Meetings of political party leaders of both sides.
5. Journalists of both sides may cross the lines by only showing their press identification cards issued by the United Nations. Open joint journalist meeting room at the Ledra Palace Hotel.
6. Meetings of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of both sides to identify and develop joint commercial projects.
7. International assistance shall benefit the two communities in an equitable manner.
8. Expert co-operation in areas such as health and the environment.
9. Co-operative arrangements on electricity, taking into account that the electric generator in the North will come on stream soon.
10. Inter-communal co-operation in Pyla, including the free movement of goods in the same manner as agreed in Varosha.
11. Co-operation between the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities of Nicosia to identify and implement joint projects for the benefit of both sides in Nicosia.
12. Co-operation with UNFICYP in extending the unmanning agreement of 1989 to cover all areas of the United Nations controlled buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other.
13. Varosha: (Doc. S/26026) The fenced area would be placed under United Nations administration as from an agreed date, pending a mutually agreed overall solution to the Cyprus problem. It would be a special area for bi-communal contact and commerce, a kind of free-trade zone in which both sides could trade goods and services.
14. Nicosia International Airport: (Doc. S/26026) The proposal on Nicosia International Airport, as supplemented in New York, would open the airport for the equal benefit of both sides.
15. Representatives of the two communities will meet periodically to propose additional confidence-building measures for implementation by both sides.

## APPENDIX VI

### Confederation Proposal

31 August, 1998

“As a final effort to achieve a mutually acceptable lasting solution in Cyprus I propose the establishment of a Cyprus Confederation based on the following arrangement:

1. A special relationship between Turkey and the TRNC on the basis of agreements to be concluded.
2. A similar special relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration on the basis of symmetrical agreements to be concluded.
3. Establishment of a Cyprus Confederation between TRNC and Greek Cypriot Administration.
4. The 1960 Guarantee System shall continue.
5. The Cyprus Confederation may, if both parties jointly agree, pursue a policy of accession to the EU. Until Turkey's full membership to the EU, a special arrangement will provide Turkey with the full rights and obligations of an EU member with regard to the Cyprus Confederation.

The ultimate aim of the negotiations will thus be a partnership settlement which will be a confederated structure composed of two peoples and of two states of the island supported by symmetrical agreements with the two respective motherlands and guarantor states. All rights and powers which are not referred to the confederal state/entity will reside with the two confederated states. The agreement to be reached as a result of the negotiations will be submitted for approval in separate referenda.

By participating in these negotiations the parties will acknowledge that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides are two sovereign and equal states, each with its own functioning democratic institutions and jurisdiction, reflecting the political equality and the will of their respective peoples. They will also acknowledge that the authorities of one party do not represent the other.

We believe that only this structure,

- a) will provide for the security of both sides,
- b) will safeguard their identity and well-being.

If the Greek Cypriots agree to this final basis, we are ready to begin negotiations to establish the Cyprus Confederation.”

## APPENDIX VII

### The Annan Plan at a Glance

**The Foundation Agreement** consists of the Main Articles and 9 Annexes

**The Main Articles** contain the principal elements of the plan. They effectively provide a ten-page summary of the Foundation Agreement.

**Annex I** is the Constitution of the United Cyprus Republic.

**Annex II** contains four Constitutional Laws. These laws were finalized by the technical committee on laws, which was formed by the two sides and chaired by the UN. In the future, additional constitutional laws may be created when agreed by the Federal Parliament and both constituent states' legislatures.

**Annex III** contains federal laws of the United Cyprus Republic. These agreements were finalized by the technical committee on laws.

**Annex IV** contains three Cooperation Agreements between the federal government and the constituent states. These agreements were finalized by the technical committee on laws.

**Annex V** contains the list of international treaties and instruments that will bind the United Cyprus Republic on entry into force of the Foundation Agreement. This list was finalized by the technical committee on treaties, which was formed by the two sides and chaired by the UN.

**Annex VI** describes the boundary between the constituent states and the phases for the transfer of administration of the areas that will be subject to territorial adjustment, as well as provisions relating to relocation of persons affected by the adjustment.

**Annex VII** describes the property regime which shall govern all properties from which people were displaced because of the events between December 1963 and the coming into force of the Foundation Agreement.

**Annex VIII** describes the composition and aims of the Reconciliation Commission.

**Annex IX** contains some specific provisions regarding the coming into being of the new state of affairs, including the referendum question, and the signing of a Treaty between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus. It also includes letters related to accession by the United Cyprus Republic to the United Nations, the European Union, and the Council of Europe.

**Constituent State Constitutions** Contains the Maps and Constitutions of the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State.

**Treaty on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus** includes the Treaty that will be signed between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (with additional protocols to the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance, as well as transitional security arrangements).

**Draft Act of Adaptation of the terms of accession of the United Cyprus Republic to the European Union** includes provisions related to the European Union accession of a reunited Cyprus to be adopted by the Council of the European Union.

**Matters to be Submitted to the United Nations Security Council for Decision** contains matters relating to which UN Security Council action will be requested. They include endorsement of the Foundation Agreement and a decision on the new mandate for the United Nations peacekeeping operation to be in place on the coming into being of the new state of affairs.

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